POWER OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AS A POST-WESTHPALIAN TYPE OF POWER

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Abstract. The analysis of the power of transnational organizations of civil society (TOCS)[1] contributes to the broader debate on the transformation of power in the post-Westphalian international environment. Changes can be observed in the mechanisms controlling processes which occur in international environment as well as in the patterns of power distribution among various participants of international relations. Another important aspect of power transformation is the diversification of its resources. The emergence of the post-Westphalian order led to a re-evaluation of the traditional perspective on power in terms of domination and force. Circumstances in which international relations are entering a post-Westphalian phase add value to a new type of power resources that differ from those of Westphalian era. 'New' resources of power are becoming available to non-governmental actors including transnational organizations of civil society. TOCS are new centres of power in the international arena and they wield a specific type of power. This article aims to analyse the power of TOCS's in post-Westphalian circumstances and to reveal their multidimensional nature.

Key words: power, global civil society, transnational actors, post-Westphalian international system

INTRODUCTION[2]

The activity of transnational organizations of civil society and their wielding of power in the international arena signify essential changes in the pattern of

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modern international relations. Firstly, there has been an unprecedented growth of organizations of civil society and a resulting shift in the roles and influence of these actors in the international arena. Secondly, there occurred a transformation in the distribution of power (an increased number and variety of actors exercise power in the international arena) as well as in the utility of its components.

Both phenomena (the strengthening of TOCS's role and the power transformation) are typical of the transformations of the post-Westphalian international system. Power has become a dynamic process, which means that it can no longer be equated with attributes of hard power such as army size, the quality of armaments, or the size of territory. Soft power attributes like an attractive ideology, culture, skilful management and inspiring values are gaining recognition. Hard power, however important it might be, is no longer a reference point in the deliberations on power in international relations.

These changes of power patterns in international relations benefit these actors which are not in the possession of such power resources as territory, army or natural resources, all of which were traditionally associated with the ability to shape international environment. Power, which was once attributed exclusively to sovereign states, has become an attribute of transnational actors, including transnational organizations of civil society. The growing influence of soft instruments of power and an increasing diversification of its sources have provided an opportunity to gain new possibilities for influencing the behaviour of other participants in international relations.

A question arises – since TOCS do not possess the resources traditionally associated with power and yet are able to influence decisions made by other participants of international relations, what is the source of this ability? This article aims to analyse TOCS's power within the frame of post-Westphalian circumstances and to reveal its multidimensional nature.

THE GROWING STRENGTH OF TOCS' POWER AS A CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF POST-WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM

The term post-Westphalian system refers to the current stage in the development of international relations. Unlike the Westphalian system of international relations, whose creation is symbolically marked by Peace of Westphalia of 1648, the contemporary international order is defined by the organization and functioning of transborder actions, processes and social phenomena.[3]

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[3]   M. Pietraś, K. Marzęda, *Wstęp*, in: *Późnowestfalski ład międzynarodowy*, eds. *eidem*, Lublin 2008, p. 9. The criterion for extracting the three stages of the development of international relations (pre-Westhpalian, Westphalian and post-Westhpalian) is the creation and change of the functioning of the centralized nation-state. See more: M. Pietraś, *Istota i ewolucja międzynarodowych stosunków politycznych*, in: *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, ed. M. Pietraś, Lublin 2007, pp. 24–43.

Changes in the international environment the resulted from the emergence of post-Westphalian order are essentially conditioned by globalisation processes equated with time-space compression – phenomena and processes of a borderless nature arise – while social groups social groups develop and sustain relations regardless of geographic distance and that are outside of or under limited control of states. The logic of post-Westphalian order can be described with a few characteristic features – its unique qualities. Marek Pietraś points to hybridization – in its functional dimension and with regard to the scope of actors – as a feature typical for post-Westphalian order. This implies that the post-Westphalian order has developed as a continuation of the West enriched by qualitatively new features. Therefore, it is a hybrid that combines features of both Westphalian and modern international systems.[4]

The hybridization of post-Westphalian environment means that the environment is no longer state-centric, but be characterised as actor-heterogenic. International society is evolving, undergoing transformation and stratification – two layers are being created. According to David Held the hybrid international order that has emerged can be described as having two parallel co-existing systems: state created and non-state actors created.[5] Therefore, a state is not perceived as the sole participant in international relations but as one of many. A sector of transnational actors organized and autonomous from states, that have the ability to act above state borders has been created parallel to the plain of interaction of states and international organizations. Transnational social space is thus being created.[6]

The scope of transnational actors and the criteria for their identification and systematization can cause inconvenience and are an object of controversy. Usually, transnational actors in international political relations include transnational corporations, international foundations, liberation movements, transnational movements and religious groups, transnational parties and political movements, transnational interest groups, terrorist organizations, organized crime structures, and finally, organizations which represent civil society and enable it to be recognised as an actor in international relations – transnational organizations of civil society (TOCS).[7]

TOCS are organizations that contribute to the recognition of individuals and social groups in the international arena – they create structures of repre-

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[4] *Ibidem*, p. 10.

[5] D. Held, *Democracy, the Nation-state and the Global System*, "Economy and Society" 1991, no. 20 (2), p. 161.

[6] M. Pietraś, *Hybrydowość późnowestfalskiego ładu międzynarodowego*, in: Późnowestfalski ład…, pp. 64–65; J. N. Rosenau, *Patterned Chaos in Global Life: Structure and Process in the Two Worlds of World Politics*, "International Political Science Review" 1998, no. 9 (4), pp. 327–364; cit. after: *Globalizacja jako proces zmiany społeczności międzynarodowej*, in: *Oblicza procesów globalizacji*, ed. M. Pietraś, Lublin 2002, p. 55.

[7] M. Pietraś, K. Piórko, *Podmioty transnarodowe*, in: *Międzynarodowe stosunki…*, p. 142.

sentation for civil society together with its values and codes, and, at the same time, their activities are not oriented towards financial gains. The transnational nature of their activities lies in the ability to take actions that cross state borders and which enter into spheres which until recently had been regulated exclusively by states. Consequently, the following should be identified as TOCS: firstly, national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which conduct international activities (whose actions are localized outside the state of their origin), for instance Polish Centre for International Aid; secondly, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) – for example Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace International, World Wildlife Fund (active in the area of natural environment preservation); thirdly, international social movements organised in the form of campaigns or coalitions – for example International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Coalition for the International Criminal Court; next individuals and social groups active in the international arena without governmental mediation or participation. It must be stressed here that only those actors which share the ethos of civil society fall into this category. In this view civil society constitutes "first and foremost, an ethical construction",[8] as to the actors of civil society, they are "thoughtful" and "civic-minded" groups.[9]

The hybridization that is a characteristic feature of post-Westphalian order can be observed in how it functions, i.e. in structures and mechanisms of management and control of the international environment.[10] As Joseph S. Nye stresses, changes brought about by the increased permeation and penetration of borders resulted in the world being "unsafe differently" – the number of processes and events taking place outside the borders and control of states is increasing.[11] Climate changes, human rights violation, poverty and social exclusion are among "borderless" problems. Kofi Annan referred to them as *problems without passports* and as such, they require *solutions without passports* as has been stressed by Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur. [12] Traditional solutions prove insufficient in the face of challenges and threats of this nature. To deal with these problems we need adequate actions which would be constantly

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[8] A. B. Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society*, Princeton 1997, p. 180; cit. after: K. Dziubka, *Społeczeństwo obywatelskie: wybrane aspekty ewolucji pojęcia*, in: *Studia z teorii polityki*, eds. A. Jabłoński, L. Sobkowiak, Warszawa 1997, vol. II, p. 46.

[9] A. Van Rooy, *The global legitimacy game: civil society, globalization and protest*, Basingstoke 2004, pp. 9 f.

[10] Other features of post-Westphalian order include the presence of opposing phenomena and processes, interpenetration of the interior of the state and the international environment and the occurrence of the so-called low intensity conflicts. See more: M. Pietraś, *Hybrydowość późnowestfalskiego ładu…*, pp. 67 f.

[11] J. S. Nye, *The Future of Power*, New York 2011, *Preface*, p. XVII.

[12] T. G. Weiss, R. Thakur, *Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey*, Bloomington 2010, p. 50.

adjusted at all levels. The key to effective management of problems without passports is creating an appropriate formula for cooperation.

In response to disturbances in the international environment, international actors coordinate their cooperation within the framework of both global governance, which can be described as "a complex process of interactive decision making which is constantly evolving in response to the shifting parameters of international environment",[13] and "new multilateralism" which consists of the reconfiguration of multilateral actions with the support of organizations of global civil society.[14] The mechanisms or managing the international environment create a platform for international decision making process whose participants are states, international organizations, and transnational actors (including civil society). According to Tanja Brühl and Volter Rittberger, the process is marked by an "increased silence" of states accompanied by a growing involvement of transnational actors.[15] Decisions taken by states no longer reflect their sole interests and aspirations but respond to a complex "constellation of interest" and values articulated not only by states but also by civil society organizations.[16]

The variety of actors participating in global management is a result of changes caused by the evolution of international power distribution. As Teresa Łoś-Nowak points out, in an anarchic international environment they are sovereign actors, i.e. states, who hold the power, whereas in a multi-centric world of non-governmental actors power can take many forms and the number of actors willing to exercise it rises.[17] In the Westphalian framework, power distribution was of a state-centric nature – it was conditioned by the state's potential and status in the international societal structure. Conditions in the post-Westphalian order facilitate the end of the monopoly of state power and state-centric distribution of power undergoes changes. Number of actors whose potential is asymmetrical to that of states and which have the capacity to influence the international environment with a wide range of means and instruments is growing.

In that context, the diversification of sources becomes an important element of power transformation. "Hard" components of power such as population, territory, industry or armed forces lose value to "soft" components, e.g., economic

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[13] A. Natorska-Michrowska, *Koncepcja procesów globalnego zarządzania*, in: M. Pietraś (ed.), *Międzynarodowe stosunki…*, p. 277.

[14] *Ibidem*, pp. 276, 291.

[15] T. Brühl, V. Rittberger, *From international to global governance: actors, collective decision-making, and the United Nations in the world of the twenty firs century*, in: *Global Governance and the United Nations System*, ed. V. Rittberger, Tokyo–New York–Paris 2001, p. 2; cit. after: A. Natorska-Michrowska, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

[16] W. Anioł, *Paradoksy globalizacji*, Warszawa 2002, pp. 197–199.

[17] T. Łoś-Nowak, *Od chaosu do ładu: w poszukiwaniu nowych form organizacji stosunków międzynarodowych*, „Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne" 2002, no. 2, p. 90.

factors, scientific and technical potential, cultural and ideological attractiveness, effective management.[18] In the process, sources of power become increasingly available to non-governmental actors. Parag Khanna reached similar conclusions, arguing that the global distribution of power should not be analysed exclusively from the perspective of its main centres and that actors functioning in the zone between the centres need to be given more attention.[19]

Power is located in those actors whose ability to influence the international environment comes from sources other than those available to states. Actors familiar with the processes conditioning the transformation of power are gaining ground. Firstly, these are powerful transnational corporations with a substantial technological and financial potential who become new holders of power in international relations. Secondly, there are transnational organizations of civil society that derive their power from innovation, flexibility, and the ability to coordinate their management on a global scale. Their constant growth in number and financial resources is also relevant.[20] It should be stressed here that the effects of power diffusion are manifold. Transnational actors can be a source of new ideas and innovative solutions as well as new threats to international security, as in case of transnational terrorist organizations.

This situation, as Hedley Bull writes, makes modern international relations similar to those of Middle Ages, when institutions and sources of power varied.[21] Currently, as Joseph S. Nye points out, power in international relations is distributed in a pattern that resembles a three-dimensional chess game – the first chessboard is of a military nature, the second is economic, the third transnational. The top and the middle chessboards, which represent military and economic relations, can be played by states, international organizations, and transnational corporations, whereas the bottom one being a transnational platform can be played by a large variety of participants, including transnational

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[18] S. P. Sałajczyk, *Zmierzch Lewiatana? Spór o pozycję państwa we współczesnych stosunkach międzynarodowych*, in: *Państwo we współczesnych stosunkach międzynarodowych*, eds. E. Haliżak, I. Popiuk-Rysińska, Warszawa 1995, pp. 166–167; J. S. Nye, *Soft power. Jak osiągnąć sukces w polityce światowej?*, Warszawa 2007, pp. 80, 131.

[19] P. Khanna, *The Second World: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-first Century*, London 2009, p. 26, cit. after: H. Münkler, *Polityczny układ sił*, interview with Zygmunt Bauman, „Newsweek" 14.06.2008, http://www.newsweek.pl/Europa/polityczny-uklad-sil,44162,1,1.html (access: 11.10.2013).

[20] The budgets of major human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are larger than the budgets of the specialized agencies of the United Nations; see more: J. S. Nye, *Soft power…*, pp. 17, 89.

[21] H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order on World Politics*, New York 1977, pp. 254–255, 264–276; cit. after: S.P. Sałajczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 171; P. J. Spiro, *New global communities, nongovernmental organizations in international decision-making institutions*, "The Washington Quarterly" 1995, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 45–46.

organizations of civil society.[22] Actors functioning in transnational space by creating private systems such as global networks supporting specific causes (e.g. environment protection) do not enter open confrontation with states – instead, they build a new layer of relations which states are not able to control totally.[23]

Undoubtedly, the post-Westphalian order – with its hybridization of actors and functions – creates a conducive environment for the growth in power of transnational actors, including TOCS. Moreover, TOCS' development can be understood as an answer to the needs of the modern international environment. As has been mentioned, the shaping of the post-Westphalian order is accompanied by phenomena that impose a challenge and a threat to the international system, new problems spread independent of territorial distances, for instance, climate change, pandemics, human rights violation. In the face of these global problems, mechanisms and means applied to date seem to be ineffective.[24] The solution to these problems requires more complex instruments and the participation of various actors. The scope of issues needing solution constantly expands, which is vital. Military force certainly constitutes a decisive argument in international politics. However, when dealing with the problems mentioned the reality of growing interdependence and complexity of international relations makes its application complicated and politically and economically unprofitable. In this context military power, however vital under other circumstances, loses its value.

The transformation of international environment leads Nye to argue that power becomes a non-zero-sum game. Interdependencies and the transnational environment resulting from the globalization processes impose challenges that cannot be dealt with when power is understood as "power over" exercised with the use of coercion and domination. An increasing number of issues require the implementation of integrating mechanisms where power is realised through cooperation, alliance and co-action within coalitions.[25] Many international problems, therefore, can be solved by wielding power "jointly with", integration, and the creation of networks of cooperation. It seems that this model of power realisation is reflected in values that form the basis for the functioning of transnational organizations of civil society since cooperation is in their very nature. In consequence, due to TOCS' presence in the international arena (as well as other transnational actors whose potential is asymmetrical to this of states) power acquires a new quality – its post-modern, post-Westphalian dimension.

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[22] J. S. Nye, *The Future…*, p. XV; see also: D. Miłoszewska, *Trójpłaszczyznowa szachownica. Segmentacja „Wielkiej Polityki" w rozważaniach Josepha S. Nye'a*, Częstochowa 2010, *passim.*

[23] J. S. Nye, *The Future…*, pp. 218 f.

[24] *Ibidem*, p. XV.

[25] *Ibidem*, pp. XVII, 90.

MULTI-DIMENSIONAL NATURE OF POST-WESTPHALIAN TOCS' POWER

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri attempted to form a concept of power transformations in the conditions of post-Westphalian order, which resulted in the creation of post-modern power theory. According to their concept, post-modern power is essentially decentralized, virtual and network-natured. These features contribute to the shift of power from easily identifiable actors to ones that are hybrid and diffused. Power is diffused among states, transnational corporations, and non-governmental organizations. Actors derive their power to influence not from the power as such but from the ability to convince others that realisation of power serves the law and peace – thus post-modern power can be defined as the ability to widen the area of agreement and to reach a consensus.[26] According to Negri and Hardt post-modern power is realized in the form of interventions not only military ones but also moral and legal.[27] Law, peace, morality and justice are motives behind wielding post-modern power.[28] Moral intervention, in the authors' opinion, is successfully exercised by such actors as modern media, religious organizations, and civil society organizations (those acting both locally and globally e.g. Amnesty International, Oxfam International, Doctors Without Borders). Among these actors, civil society organizations play a key role in wielding post-modern power since they are not immediately influenced by governments, and therefore, can be regarded as acting on the basis of moral and ethical imperatives.[29]

Considerations of the authors of "Empire"[30] laid the basis for the identification of three dimensions of post-modern (post-Westphalian) power wielded by TOCS: structural power, value power, cyberpower. The first dimension of post-Westphalian TOCS' power is s t r u c t u r a l p o w e r. For purposes of the present argument two types of structural power have been identified. The first is identified with management skills – it is based on the internal management and organization of TOCS. The second type has been analysed on the basis of Susan Strange's concept and identified as the ability to create and maintain a certain context. In both cases structural power essentially means the ability to influence international society – either through a model of internal management or through the creation of supportive aura for decision making.

The network model of organization provides a key to the understanding of TOCs' structural power. According to Manuel Castells, the analysis of modern

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[26] M. Hardt, A. Negri, *Imperium*, Warszawa 2005, pp. 30, 51; see also: A. Wojciuk, *Dylematy potęgi. Praktyczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warszawa 2010, pp. 193–198.

[27] *Ibidem*, p. 51.

[28] See more: A. Wojciuk, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

[29] M. Hardt, A. Negri, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[30] Observations and concept of the authors do not represent a rigid framework of definitions but rather an inspiration and starting point for further analysis considering the power of TOCS.

society (which he calls *network society*) shows that networked organization of vital actions and social structures is the most prominent tendency.[31] He adds that networks constitute "new morphology of society" and the logic of networking substantially changes the functioning mode of international society-processes of culture, production and governance.[32] A social structure organized in a network constitutes a dynamic, open and decentralized system that can expand in a limitless manner, which integrates new elements as long as they maintain their communication within the network – i.e. as long as they share the same communication codes, for instance aims or values. A network provides a structure within which distant points (individuals, states, non-governmental organizations) can connect. Such a connection expedites and improves the quality of contacts between points – they become more frequent and intense. Common values and goals provide elements that build the network.[33] Resorting to such moded of action TOCS are state independent, they create international alliances and exert influence on states from outside.

The fact that networks are susceptible to innovation is crucial, at the same time their flexible structure prevents inner imbalances. Because of this actors in a network structure (including TOCS) gain advantage over states in the area of management and organization as such a form guarantees adaptability. The way in which transnational organizations of civil society function reflects the logic of the network – they are flexible, innovative, adapt easily to environment transformations, and are capable of changing their mandate depending on the circumstances. In the face of transnational global problems and under the circumstances of an environment that "gets complicated faster than it ripens" such capabilities greatly determine the effectiveness of actions taken.

At the same time the power derived from an organization model is realized not only towards the "outside" environment. In case of TOCS, attractive work-styles, lack of a hierarchical structure, flexibility, networking and the use of innovative technological solutions are highly attractive features for current and potential members of organizations. Knowledge communities constitute a specific type of network, which is worth drawing attention to. These transnational network structures of experts' cooperation derive their attractiveness from the fact that participation in them provides good training and learning opportunities, and what is more, it is prestigious and career-building. Membership in experts' communities is regarded highly desirable by their members. Therefore, they readily participate in such communities.[34]

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[31] M. Castells, *The Rise of The Network Society*, Oxford 2001, p. 500.

[32] *Idem*, *Społeczeństwo sieci*, Warszawa 2007, p. 467.

[33] *Ibidem*, p. 468.

[34] A. Dumała, *Wspólnoty epistemologiczne i koalicje adwokackie – uczestnicy stosunków międzynarodowych 'sui generis'*, in: *Niepaństwowi uczestnicy stosunków międzynarodowych*, ed. A. Pawłowska, Lublin 2010, p. 84.

As Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink point out, transnational networks multiply the message of civil society organizations, which can take the form of persuasion, lobbing, providing evidence such as expertise and files as well as protests and pressurising. The mechanism is not perfect, it works in a selective manner – certain messages are multiplied, others are ignored. Nonetheless, as the authors stress, in a world dominated by messages issued by states, civil society networks provide new opportunities, open new channels for articulation of alternative visions, propositions, and solutions to various problems, which enriches and diversifies international debate.[35]

Networks can be also analysed as participants in international relations. In this understanding, global political networks play a vital role in the creation of platforms for international public debates on issues of transnational nature. Transparency International (TI), which has made the corruption problem a subject of international debate, serves as a good example. TI activities made the problem of corruption a subject of public interest on state and global levels. What is more, due to TI a multi-sector network coalition to fight corruption was created.[36]

In the opinion of Hardt and Negri, a network, as an important element of post-modern power, is characterised by dispersion and its centre is therefore difficult to identify. This enables an actor in possession of such power to solve problems and carry out tasks which traditional structures of power cannot cope with, since their centralised nature and hierarchy impose barriers preventing flexible actions. Post-modern power is in a ceaseless process of evolution and formation – this is why it easily adapts to changes. Due to its network structure it cannot be unilateral. Networking means cooperation with other participants who have similar goals and ierarchy of values.[37] As a result, post-modern power essentially lies in the ability to reach an agreement i.e. establish cooperation, persuade others to undertake actions in order to obtain goals.

The attractiveness of this form of social organization and human potential management lies in the fact, according to Hardt and Negri, that network power does not distance nor alienate its sources from society, remaining entirely within reach. Power is localized within society, and its sources are of a root nature. In this sense "power is not something which rules us, but it is what we do".[38]

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[35] M.E. Keck, K. Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca 1998, pp. 35 ff.

[36] A. Rothert, *Emergencja rządzenia sieciowego*, Warszawa 2008, p. 186; J. M. Witte, W. H. Reinicke, T. Benner, *Networked Governance: Developing a Research Agenda*, pp. 16–17, available on: http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/Reinicke-Benner-Witte%20ISA%202002.pdf (access: 16.10.2012).

[37] M. Hardt, A. Negri, *Multitude. War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, New York 2004, pp. 57–58; available on: http://selforganizedseminar.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/hardt_negri_multitude.pdf (access: 15.10.2012); see also: A. Wojciuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 197–198.

[38] M. Hardt, A. Negri, *Imperium*, p. 180.

These considerations illustrate one face of TOCS' structural power. Susan Strange's concept of structural power is also meaningful for the analysis. She points to different dimensions of that power[39] and concludes that a common element in all is the ability of an actor wielding power to "change the scope of choices available to other actors, without the need to exert pressure in order to enforce decisions or make a concrete choice".[40] In this view, structural power essentially means an ability to create and maintain a context for decision making and opportunities for the establishing "rules of the game," i.e., determining codes of behaviour for other actors. These rules establish cause and effect relationships between conditions and the possibilities for action available to individual actors.[41]

It can therefore be argued that the essence of TOCS' power lies in agenda setting, i.e. in establishing the order of international debate by introducing issues and problems which are of particular interest to civil society organizations. Using structural power, TOCS direct public attention to matters and events of their choice, placing them in the centre of international society. This model of exerting influence, based on shaping awareness and creating interest, inflates the importance of certain matters. Agenda setting is inevitably related to the ability to create context – a climate supportive to decision making. It is achieved by raising the rank of particular messages and to a certain extent involves manipulation – strengthening certain points of TOCS' messages while ignoring others. The tactics is to add value to a problem and exert influence on international environment by spreading a conducive aura.[42]

Thus, it can be concluded that TOCS' structural power constitutes a specific conglomeration of two dimensions of the concept: their internal structure and functioning and in their ability to shape the international environment in desired ways through creating a context conducive to making decisions which are in line with TOCS interests.

Structural power is closely linked to v a l u e   p o w e r. This type of power is drawn from the values propagated and incorporated by TOCS. The catalogue of values held by international society includes international justice, solidarity, superiority of human rights above states jurisprudence, tolerance towards different value systems, acknowledging the role and meaning of an individual.[43] The

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[39] S. Strange, *States and Markets*, New York 1994, p. 24 f.

[40] *Ibidem*, p. 29.

[41] A. Zybertowicz, R. Sojak, *Transformacja podszyta przemocą: o nieformalnych mechanizmach przemian strukturalnych*, Toruń 2008, p. 190.

[42] H. A. Semetko, P. M. Valkenburg, *Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news*, "Journal of Communication" 2000, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 93–109; R. Sobiech, *Media, opinia publiczna, problem społeczne*, http://www.isns.uw.edu.pl/materialy_od_wykladowcow/sobiech/teorie_mediow.pdf (access: 1.10.2012).

[43] A. Chodubski, *Wartości kształtującego się globalnego społeczeństwa obywatelskiego*, „Cywilizacja i Polityka" 2003, no. 1, p. 12.

basic motive behind civil society organizations' intervention into international relations is to realize their primary interests, that is, balanced development of international relations conducted with the preservation of international justice and human rights. TOCS' activity expresses a certain kind of global solidarity, justice and responsibility for the future of the planet.[44] In that sense TOCS represent a broadly understood public interest beyond states' perspectives, they take on the role of the 'world's conscience'[45] and of transnational moral authority.[46] According to Gerald M. Steinberg these moral claims staked by civil society organizations constitute the main source of their power.[47] Consequently, TOCS power has its source in and is expressed by their leadership in the area of opinion making on norms and values.[48]

It is worth bringing into attention the concept of discourse and knowledge promoted by postmodernists and constructivists, and the role these two play in the making and shaping of reality. Power here is interpreted as having a discursive nature and consists in giving and controlling meanings that result from common understanding, perception and action of social actors, joint labelling and hierarchy building.[49] It seems that this type of "discursive"[50] power is in the nature of civil society organizations, which take on the role of "advocates and judges of global values", incite public indignation against violations of norms, thereby creating and increasing local and global awareness of values.[51] As Urlich Beck writes, in the global game of "power and counter-power" global society organizations grow in meaning, especially in the context of creating global norms and values. Contemporary conditions shaped by the process of globalization and characterised by scarcity of legitimisation and democracy give TOCS an advantage over other participants in international relations and an opportunity for development and strengthening of their power.[52]

The style of narration and the attractiveness of rules, both of which are connected with the areas of interest of civil society organizations, are of great value.

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[44] M. Zachara *Global governance. Ład międzynarodowy po zakończeniu stulecia Ameryki*, Kraków 2012, p. 152.

[45] U. Beck, *Władza i przeciwwładza w epoce globalnej. Nowa ekonomia polityki światowej*, Warszawa 2005, p. 108.

[46] R. D. Lipschutz, C. Fogel, *"Regulation for the rest of us?" Global civil society and the privatization of transnational regulation*, in: *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*, eds. R. B. Hall, T. J. Biersteker, Cambridge 2007, p. 117.

[47] G. M. Steinberg, *The Politics of NGOs, Human Rights and the Arab-Israel Conflict*, "Israel Studies" 2011, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 25.

[48] H. Münkler, *op. cit.*

[49] J. Czaputowicz, *Teoria stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 296–297.

[50] B. Arts, *Non-State Actors in Global Governance. Three Faces of Power*, Bonn 2003, p. 22.

[51] U. Beck, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[52] *Ibidem*, pp. 28, 301.

Areas of TOCS' involvement "privilege" them to use a specific lexicon and narration,[53] which make up a language of "human rights defenders", of "humanitarian aid providers" and finally, of "natural environment guardians". For example, *Amnesty International* presents itself in the following way "Locally, nationally and globally, we join together to mobilize public pressure and show international solidarity... Until every person can enjoy all of their rights, we will continue our efforts. We will not stop until everyone can live in dignity".[54] *Greenpeace International* has the mission to protect biodiversity, prevent pollution, and land, oceans, air and drinking water overexploitation, put an end to the nuclear threat, promote peace and global disarmament.[55] Human Rights Watch emphasizes values such as justice and security – "Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide....and pressures those with power to respect rights and secure justice".[56] Transparency International defines its activity by pointing to, firstly, "to stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society" and secondly, to the core values behind their actions, i.e., "transparency, accountability, integrity, solidarity, courage, justice, democracy".[57] The specific vocabulary that civil society organizations utilize undoubtedly works to their advantage; it contributes to the belief that their actions are in a just cause. It is conducive to the strengthening of TOCS' moral authority and image of actors whose activities foster the realization of public interest.

Realization of the value power by TOCS, especially within transnational advocacy networks, is based on a process well depicted by Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. This consists in a three stage investigation being conducted by civil society organizations. In the first stage a problem is defined. The fact that organizations of civil society work for the public interest and the issues they tackle are of "higher rank" is vital in this context. In the second stage victims, i.e. persons who suffer due to other actors' actions, are identified. In the third stage the perpetrators, i.e. actors responsible for the current state of affairs, are exposed. The authors point out that the credibility of victims can be questioned by the accused, and therefore, success of TOCS' actions is not guaranteed, but it is an important element that stimulates the imagination of public opinion[58].

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[53] Gerald M. Steinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[54] *Amnesty International` website*, http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/about-amnesty--international (access: 15.05.2014).

[55] *Greenpeace International` website*, http://www.greenpeace.org/poland/pl/ (access: 15.05.2014).

[56] *Human Rights Watch` website*, http://www.hrw.org/about (access: 15.05.2014).

[57] *Transparency International` website*, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/mission_vision_and_values (access: 15.05.2014).

[58] M. E. Keck, K. Sikkink, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

The procedure can be successfully utilised only when the problem is pre-sented in a cause-and-effect way – irresponsible activities by one group are proven to harm ecological or social conditions in which another group lives. This cause-and-effect chain of events should not have too many elements. A brief and concise message ensures the clarity of the activists' statement and prevents the effect of blurring the responsible actors upon which TOCS wish to execute a change of behaviour.[59] The mechanism is frequently employed in *name and shame* campaigns, aimed at harmful practices of transnational corpo-rations or states violating human rights. The strategy is utilised by ecologically-minded TOCS as well. The campaign conducted by civil society organizations to include the Kyoto Protocol in the UN Convention on Climate Change was based on the production of proof of the harmful impact of global warming on the life of island communities.

Hard and Negri also direct attention to this mechanism of power realiza-tion. They identify a moral intervention conducted with the implementation of "moral instruments" as a form of power projection. This type of intervention is essentially practised by civil society organizations fighting "just wars" without weapons or violence and regardless of borders. Activities conducted by non-governmental organizations consist of several stages – first, common needs are recognised, then, "a culprit" is identified, and finally, reparation activities are undertaken (public shaming of the "culprit"). Such intervention is a post-mod-ern mechanism of power wielding.[60]

Another dimension of post-Westphalian power is c y b e r p o w e r. Power based on information resources as such is not new to international relations. Cyberpower, however, is; in quantitive terms it can be defined as power based on resources related to "creation, control and spreading of electronic information".[61] The spectrum of its resources include infrastructure, networks, software, skills and knowledge. In qualitative terms cyberpower means "the ability to obtain desired results through information technology resources which are electronically connected in a virtual cyberspace".[62] According to Nye cyber-power can be utilised in a twofold manner: firstly, in order to obtain desired results in cyberspace and secondly, in order to obtain desired results in other areas – outside cyberspace.[63] Cyberspace has an advantage over traditional areas of power realizations on three levels – the number of participants, ease of access, and the possibility to hide or camouflage actions.[64] Nye rightly points out that cyberspace cannot replace geographical space and will not destroy the

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[59] *Ibidem.*
[60] M. Hardt, A. Negri, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–54.
[61] J. S. Nye, *The Future…*, p. 123.
[62] *Ibidem*, pp. 122–123.
[63] On this basis J. S. Nye distinguishes intra-cyberspace power (the impact area is cyber-space) and extra-cyberspace power (directed outside the virtual space).
[64] J. S. Nye, *The Future…*, p. 125.

sovereignty of states. However, its mere existence will complicate the functioning (including the realization of power) of sovereign national states.[65]

Cyberspace is an easily accessible sphere, because of the low costs of purchasing and exploiting the tools and instruments of cyberpower. This contributes to the dispersion of power among various actors, including non-governmental ones. One can stake a claim that it is in the cyberspace that the diffusion of power is realised to its fullest potential. Of primary importance is the fact that transnational actors play a meaningful role in cyberspace – possibly, of greater value than outside virtual space – but bear minor financial expenses. This space demolishes barriers and limitations, thus enabling a global flow of ideas and instant exchange of information. Because of these features TOCS can reach a large number of people in order to present their mission. Until recently, gathering information was the source of power, but today it is the spreading and sharing of knowledge and information that multiplies power. It seems that the key to understanding the phenomenon of TOCS' cyberpower lies in the way they manage information. TOCS equalize the accessibility to information and knowledge through information technologies.[66]

Activists "armed" in modern technologies become a source of innovation, creativity, new ideas, and, most importantly, of power to reshape their environment such as the transformation of a political system of a state. The mechanism of TOCS' cyberpower is based on the cooperation of individuals who, through technological infrastructure- utilising the opportunities created by new technologies and social media – get organised in order to realize common aims. It is significant that social cooperation spreads across borders at great speed. TOCS' instruments of power, in this case, are social networking sites and internet communicators. Most popular among these are Facebook (with 750 mln active users worldwide), Twitter communicator, and YouTube.[67]

The characteristics of power within transnational and virtual space, and also the maladjustment of state structures to the transformations of modern power have been investigated by Zygmunt Bauman: "power, might – *Macht*, as Max Weber used to say, – has been soaring in extraterritorial space, while all democratic institutions, institutions of political control over power execution are still local. This means that the real might – *Macht* – is out of reach".[68] Therefore, it can be assumed that virtual space constitutes a potential source of power, but only for those actors who know how to harmonize adjust their functions and structure to its specific conditions. How effectively actors exercise it as an instrument for the realisation of particular goals depends on their adaptability

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[65] *Ibidem*, p. 121 f.

[66] D. Kirkpatrick, *Potęga społeczności*, "Forbes" 2011, no. 10, p. 62.

[67] *Ibidem*, pp. 58, 62.

[68] *Tak zwana globalizacja*, Witold Gadomski interview with Zygmunt Bauman, „Gazeta Wyborcza", 09.11.2001, http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,534465.html (access: 11.10.2012).

and flexibility. It seems that actors whose qualities, organization and functional logicreflect the characteristics of this environment will use the potential of virtual space to the best effect. TOCS with their flexibility and network structure and great adaptation skills seem to be "programmed" to function in such space.

Sidney Tarrow, who conducted research on social movements and their impact on powers, reached the conclusion that mass trust, which provides the basis for the cooperative functioning of structures of this nature, cannot develop and strengthen without the collective, immediate experiences of participants involved in the cooperation. Such experiences can be drawn from immediate encounters in the sphere of reality, which is of primary importance in establishing mutual trust, and cooperation within the frameworks of networks and social movements. Virtual activism is free from such implications.[69] Tarrow's conclusions acquire a new meaning in the context of arguments about the shortcomings of global civil society, whose activity is becoming increasingly virtual. According to Harris Breslow global civil society will always suffer limitations due to the fact that functioning in virtual space deprives the created structures of its truly civil and communal character.[70] Such an opinion seems ungrounded. As a rule, activities and strategies of global civil society combine elements of virtual and real space. Internet facilitates these actors' functioning, exchange of information, organization of actions, and communication between organizations and between members and organizations. Virtual activism does not replace real activism--it fortifies and completes it. *Pirates' Party* and *Anonymous* may serve as examples of actors who function in the manner described above (at the same time their activities show how transnational actors exercise cyberpower through utilization of cyberspace' infrastructure) – they are transnational actors whose activity is based on skillful combination of virtual and real spaces.

Such a mode of functioning, which combines traditional methods with innovative technologies, is typical for the majority of global organizations of civil society. Actually, there is no major organization that would not run its own website or fanpage on a social networking site. Undoubtedly, cyberspace creates supportive conditions for the functioning of transnational organizations of civil society, its environment fosters successful realization of manifold functions. Within cyberspace TOCS coordinate their actions, communicate with current members and donors as well recruit new ones. Above all, they take advantage of cyberspace to mobilize individuals to mass action (for instance, the Indignants Movement organizes their street protests and demonstrations through Internet), encourage petition signing, letter writing (Amnesty International), boycott of

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[69] S. Tarrow, *Power in Movements: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Cambridge 2011, pp. 119–125.

[70] H. Breslow, *Civil Society, Political Economy, and the Internet*, in: S. G. Jones (ed.), *Virtual Culture: Identity and Communication in Cybersociety*, London 1997, pp. 236–257, cit. after: R. J. Deibert, *International Plug`n Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet, and Global Public Policy*, „International Studies Perspectives" 2000, no. 1, p. 256.

services or products of transnational corporations (Greenpeace International), and lastly, to influence public opinion.

The power of transnational organizations of civil society stems from their ability to adjust to specific parameters of the space and to utilise its characteristics to realize their interests. In that sense, the power to influence that these actors wield is a specific type of cyberpower, and essentially, it lies in the ability to utilise the infrastructure of virtual space in order to amplify their influence on the surrounding environment, both virtual and real. Reaching for modern technological tools in order to increase one's effectiveness does not diminish the civil or communal nature of organizations.