

BALANCE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN MEXICO, 2006–2012

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Abstract. This contribution tries to make a critical evaluation to the *National Security Strategy* driven by the former President of Mexico Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, from 2006 to 2012, as well as the performance of the armed forces, the base of the government's response against drug trafficking during those six years.

Key words: National Security Strategy, Armed Forces, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, Mexico

INTRODUCTION

Ten days before taking his place as President, Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa (2009, pp. 17–21) launches his national security strategy, named “war against drug trafficking”; this is the official discourse that contains disturbing similarities with the discourse of the former USA President, George Bush Jr. (2001–2009), who declares “war against terrorism”, immediately after the successful terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Five years and a half later, in his last accountability, Mexican Presidency (2012, Juridical Certainty, p. 82) insists on the principal commitment that, as the backbone of its management crosses through the government period (six years):

Since the beginning of this administration, the Government of President took as one of its fundamental commitments to strengthen the rule of law; respect for all human rights; the transformation of the justice, prison and security systems; and endorsed his

constitutional and ethical responsibility to firmly combat organized crime through the National Security Strategy. As a result of this National Strategy, Mexico now has the institutional foundations to consolidate a true and lasting security (...) From December 2006 to July 2012, the Federal Forces managed to disable the 60% or 22 of the 37 suspected country's most dangerous criminals according to the list published in March 2009 by the Attorney General of the Republic.

Where, calls the attention the absence of self-criticism from the Presidency; in which, the reader is in front of a triumphant speech that finds its maximum expression in one indicator proposed by the Federal government: the number of drug trafficking leaders trapped or neutralized, from a list made by the same authorities.

According to Barrón Cruz (2012, Presentation), the reason for this lies in the stubbornness of the federal executive to guide its policy around the six-year fight against drug trafficking, using the generation of fear in society through a policy of vertical confrontation to certain organized crime groups.

Now, the so-called war against drug trafficking is hardly criticized by who, in recent years, was responsible for fighting drugs in Colombia:

Installing the word war in the frame of a political security policy is a big mistake. For many reasons, the first one is that ignores an elementary principle of a rule of law where the offender is not an enemy to eliminate, the offender is somebody to whom the State must submit to the law and reform. Second, is a subject that polarizes around security, and the proper word does not appear like a value, but as a problem. And third, it generates in the criminal's mind the state of certainty: meanwhile they kill me, I kill. Therefore, the big opportunity that exists today (...) is that large part of the security policy must legitimate not form the fight against the crime, but from the sensibility for the victims. The security is not an end in itself; is a path to generate coexistence and to assure rights and freedom.

(Newspaper El País, 2012)

Thus, the category friend-enemy from the jurist, political scientist and ideologist from Third Reich (1933–1945) Carl Schmitt (1932), begins to dominate the national security strategy of alternating government from second generation. In other words, is about the domain of logic in national security, the concept of threat, of expansion of criminal law (from identification to the so-called criminal law of the enemy of Günther Jakobs, which is incorporated into the Constitution under the figures of isolation and preventive detention) and the preeminence of the factor or military component from the Mexican national power.

This follows from the National Security Programme 2009–2012 (2009, pp. 4 and 7), which conceives the national security threat as an intentional phenomenon generated by the power-of-state, or non-state actors referred, whose particular mark is a hostile and deliberate will that puts in danger of violation – particularly serious – the permanent interests protected by national security, in part or in the whole country, and questions the existence of the state, while identifies drug trafficking as the main threat to national security, to be erected in

the most significant manifestation of organized crime and therefore focus phenomenon, particularly its penetration power in institutions and society:

In the topic of National Security, the essential factor from every expression of organized crime is the high economical capacity that allows the penetration in public institutions and in the social structure. Thus, the concrete threat is the weakening of economy, the society and the government institutions, factors which combination and persistence, wane the territorial State's control.

The actions taken by this government to fight drug trafficking, mark a turning point in the State's pressure over the criminal organizations that had been reacting with violence between them, against the civil population and against the authority as a way to defying the State.

Summarizing, since the beginnings of his administration, the president Calderón takes the decision of dealing with drug trafficking, under the idea-force of defeating the principal threat to the national security or Mexicans' enemy and thus achieve the consolidation of an authentic and lasting security. Reasons of State (*raison d'Etat*) is transformed, therefore, in the argument that sustains all the support to an answer *manu militari*, by resorting to the maximum intensity of the use of force of the Mexican state, his instrument or military component.

Hence, this article will attempt to account for the role of the military in national security strategy, which strategic objective is the recovery of public spaces ceded to organized crime in general and drug trafficking in particular, such as shown in the First Report of the government of President Felipe Calderon:

The drug trafficking is a illegal activity, of high economical value that generates high levels of violence and social fragmentation. The cartels of drug trafficking are the most powerful arm on organized crime that besides of using Mexico as a transit territory, tries to transform it in a consumer country. Therefore, this government, as never before applies all the force of State to *recover the spaces that had been kidnapped by bands of drug dealers and other criminal organizations*, and to avoid states of the republic being hostages.

(2007, the underlined is ours)

RULE OF LAW *DE JURE* AGAINST AN STATE OF EXCEPTION *DE FACTO*

To do this, it is chosen the strategy in the direct action mode, to commit or engage in military and marine without declaring a state of emergency as enshrined in Article 29 of the Constitution (See: Moloeznik 2010), but rather, the supreme commander of armed forces have the right to dispose of the permanent armed force of the nation for internal security, embodied in Article 89, Section VI of the Constitution (2012). Highlighting that internal security is a nineteenth-century relic that has endured in the Constitution of the United Mexican States and as the mission of the army, air force and navy; is a security dimension that

is not defined, lacking a regulatory law, and that alone has contributed to confusion, to be used by the President as synonymous with national security. The paradox is that the last one is not accessed as mission in the organic laws of the armed forces.

If exceptional situations – as, for example, the absence of effective sovereignty exercise in some parts of the national territory – forced the President of the Republic to appeal to measures or exceptional responses as the mobilization of the armed forces, to face directly the drug trafficking, as the principal manifestation of organized crime, the truth is that this option was decided without the suspension of some human rights as established in the 29th article from the National Supreme Law.

This means that, *de jure*, in the Mexican Republic – along the six years of management from Calderón – is now in effect the human rights and the rule of law; despite, *de facto*, where the armed forces interact, put exception measures, accompanied by the fear generation in the Mexican society.

What results paradoxical is that the alternating government is the one who achieves the consolidation of the militarization public security process (see, for example: Moloeznik and Suárez de Garay 2012), which brings an undeniable human and institutional attrition, at not being the military prepared to perform tasks and functions that are not inherently; to which is added the systematic violation of human rights. Along the actual six years, the signs (complaints) against members of the National Defense Secretary (SEDENA, Army & Air Force) and the Navy Secretary (SEMAR, Navy), because of breaking basic rights, and the recommendations by the National Human Rights Commission (2012) because of serious violations to human rights, outweigh the historical statistics.

Meanwhile, in the Sixth Report of the Federal Government (2012, defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity, pp. 84 and 85) realizes, among others, the following activities that correspond to the increasing militarization of public safety in the country:

It were integrated 650 bases of mixed operations, where 14,109 military elements participated in the states of Chiapas, Coahuila, Colima, Durango, Mexico, Guerrero, Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Puebla, Sinaloa y Veracruz.

These activities consist in making patrols, establishing military security outposts; taking part in the execution of presentation orders; arresting and searching warrants in support of the ministerial authorities; assisting civilians in the commission of crime or in case of withdrawal; obtaining information for the whole plan; assisting in the fight against drug trafficking and application of the Federal Firearms and explosives.

In addition, the impact of the international right of human rights and the deterioration of the Mexican image in the concert of the nations, particularly to the light of the six resolutions made by the Interamerican Court of Human Rights against the Mexican State between 2008 and 2010, to know: the case Castañeda Gutman, the 6th August 2008; the case González and others (known

as “cotton field”), the 16th November 2009; the case Radilla Pacheco, the 23rd November 2009; the case Fernández Ortega and others, the 30 August 2010; the case Rosendo Cantú and other, the 31st August 2010; and, the case Cabrera García and Montiel Flores, the 26th November 2010. (See: García Ramírez and Del Toro Huerta 2011.)

To the margin, then, of the Federal¹ government interpretation – and even the National Supreme Justice Court² – is about the legality of having available the armed forces to face the drug trafficking, the regional protection of human rights system – of which the Mexican State take part of – through its sentences, questions the involvement of soldiers and sailors in the area of public safety and let us see that their performances lack of the necessary legal protection and that, even, in the future can be call to recall back.

In the same way, the general of division (retired) Luis Garfias Magaña (2012) declares, who in a recent interview accepts that:

The Armed Forces are acting without the right legal support; the communication means talk constantly of the exception state, but there is not one. They talk repeatedly of the *militarization of the country*, but with so ignorance that makes one stay cold because they use so lightly the concepts (...). I insist, the Army is acting without the right legal support (...). The Army's function is in luck of legal limbo. We have five years without definition and the Congress had not been assertive because it still do not talk about these things.

It is the legitimate demand of the military by a regulatory framework that supports their actions as the cornerstone of the strategy of former President Calderon.

¹ In the case of the Navy, the performance of this institution beyond its jurisdiction, responds to a verbal order character imparted by the president of the republic and under Article 3 of the Organic Law of the Navy of Mexico (2002), which states that naval power “... execute its powers by itself or together with the Army and Air Force or together with federal executive agencies, when ordered by the Supreme Command or when circumstances so require.”

² Five Theses of the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (Thesis XXV/96, XXVII/96, XXVIII/96, XXIX/96 and XXX/96) states that the three forces “can participate in civil actions for public safety, in aid of the civil authorities.” Subsequently, in interpreting Article 129 of the Constitution, the highest law court feel that “the participation of the Armed Forces in aid of civil authorities is constitutional” (Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, 2000), which explains, in largely why since I started the national security strategy with the direct involvement of the military, has not declared a state of emergency in Mexico. However, to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC 2012, p. 25), the advantage of his statement, is to allow people to know exactly the scope of material and temporal territorial emergency measures and prevent facto suspensions and subsequent attempts to justify human rights violations.

ABSENCE OF A DIAGNOSIS AND BET FOR MASSIVENESS AND QUANTITY

But, perhaps the most negative of the national security strategy and the decision of putting out the military from their bases, is the recognition that the state's response does not respond to a previous diagnosis, that is, the lack of a diagnosis of the drug trafficking magnitude and scope as the big threat to Mexican national security, as evidenced by a recognized member of the Collective Security Analysis with Democracy (CASEDE): (See: Medellín 2008) the acceptance by the general three interviewed by this reporter, Guillermo Galván, Juan Alredo Oropeza Garniza and Mario Ayón Rodríguez the lack of anti-drug strategy, not having anything planned, to recognize that things are becoming as they emerge, on the fly and adjusting plans as well as distribution and logistics operational scenarios as they arise in conflict.

That is, of improvisation, at the time, antithesis of a conscious and deliberate planning from diagnosis, from which:

... it is visible that it never was really an "strategy" that considers the consequences of facing the drug trafficking organizations with the Security Forces. In other words which were the risks or consequences that would be released at facing the suffer threats. Because of that facing a problem with not "strategy" leads to failure, the most reliable prove is the regrettable number of victims not linked with the drug trafficking organizations.

(Barrón Cruz 2012, p. 23)

In addition, the paradigms in security subject that lead the performance of the Federation Executive Power and their corrective instruments, must not be ignored (for more information: Moloeznik 2011):

- *Massiveness instead of selectivity*, precisely before the absence of a diagnosis it is decided to face, simultaneously, to all the delinquency groups. In this framework, the more aggressive and responsible groups are not separated from the ones of low profile; but, also, it is not taken in account a basic principle of the strategic planning, what is the correspondence between means and ends (strategic objective followed). It might be questionable if the Mexican State has the capacities to face, simultaneously and in a successful way, to all the drug cartels.
- *Quantity for quality* emphasizes relatively simple components of measuring, to the detriment of qualitative factors tangible and intangible. In this way, it is chosen the increase of effectives under arms, the acquisition of more weapons and ammunition stock, while helicopter gunships and armored patrols that push away, even more, the official in charge of enforcing the law of the citizen to is due, in a logic of national security and fighting the enemy.

In this work frame the cases of SEDENA and SEMAR are inserted, passing from 244,238 militaries and marines at the end of Vicente Fox Quesada (2000–2006) administration, to 263,930 elements in June 2012.

Table 1. Mexican Armed Force Effectives

Year	Total	SEDENA	SEMAR
2000	237 552	182 329	55 228
2001	234 308	185 143	49 165
2002	238 169	188 143	50 026
2003	238 447	191 143	47 304
2004	238 459	191 143	47 316
2005	238 787	191 143	47 644
2006	244 238	196 767	47 471
2007	246 742	196 710	50 032
2008	254 035	202 355	51 680
2009	258 992	206 013	52 979
2010	259 237	206 013	53 224
2011	259 630	206 013	53 617
2012	263 930	209 716	54 214

Source: Republic presidency (2012), the Sixth Report of the Federal Government, *Statistical Annex*, p. 81.

In the other side, the Sixth Report of the Federal Government (2012, defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity, p. 85) presents the National Seas and Coasts Protection Index that, for the first semester of 2012 achieved an advance of 77% respect to the annual programmed goal and an advance of 77% respect to the sexennial. This indicator evaluates the operative capacity of the navy to protect the maritime Mexican interests, through the measuring of the performance of the Mexican Army components. Which is disturbing since Mexico is a country with a huge extension of coast.

What happens is that, strictly speaking, the Mexican fleet is a naval coast force or of territorial coast defense (Booth 1980: 20 and Till 2003), in charge of assuring the effective control of its territorial waters (territorial sea) and the partial or limited surveillance of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ); with privilege instruments the patrolling aviation based in earth, and a large number of surface light vessels such as coastal patrols, intercepting and oceans.

What results by far disturbing is that the army report more number of kilometers marched than nautical miles sailed. (See: Table Protection and surveillance of territory, aerial space and national seas, 2007–2012; in: Sixth Report of the Federal Government 2012, p. 84.)

In this line, it is emphasized the reorganization and creation of the marine infantry battalion, with the objective of:

... fighting in a frontal way to delinquency and the insecurity (...) according to the situation and necessities of each coastal State, will translate in a better Institutional performance in the functions of maritime police (...) increase the presence of the naval personal in the coast line of the country, in function to maritime police, allows the strength of the Mexican Army response capacity, to collaborate in a more effective way in the efforts that makes the Federal Government in the organized delinquency and in drug trafficking fight.

(SEMAR 2007)

What is explained, in part, in the light of the commitment to the land component of naval power, ad hoc instrument to the strategy of frontal attack on drug trafficking so (Presidency, 2012, defense of the sovereignty and integrity the territory, p. 87):

Equipment was continued 32 Marine Battalions with 78% cumulative progress in arms and ammunition and 60% on the purchase of vehicles.

For that, actually in the Mexican navy, the relationship is one marine for every 3 sailors, according to *The Military Balance* (2012, p. 396); in other words, an oversizing of the Marine infantry.

Neither must be ignored the territorial deployment of SEDENA and, in minor way, of SEMAR:

Established in the 1920s the military domain geographical feature in the country with a presidential control criterion remained stable until the 1970s. Thus, from the 1990s to 2012 territorial military presences of both the army and the navy has been a steady increase (except the last which was subject to restructuring changes during the Fox administration). The site currently comprises 46 military zones included 12 regions (Table omitted the reference to air bases) and 14 naval zones in 8 regions.

(Tirado and Moloeznik 2012, p. 8)

Table 2. Territorial location Army-Navt in Mexico, 1924–2012

Year/Period	Army		Navy	
	Military Zones	Military Regions	Naval Zones	Naval Regions
1924–1970	33			
1975	35			
1992	36	9	15	8
2000	41	12	17	6
2005	45	12	10	6
2012	46	12	14	8

Source: Tirado and Moloeznik 2012, pp. 8–9.

The reader is confronted with a consistent pattern of expanding or strengthening its presence in the size of the military force of the Mexican state; strength of permanent deployment in the country to all inoperative lights to the manifestations of drug trafficking and organized crime. Precisely where one might suppose that the military presence was the guarantee of the state's authority, for three decades, at least, it appears that the phenomenon of crime simply appropriated specific geographic areas.

To this process of public security militarization growth that goes beyond of using military, as it incorporates in a direct way the Army through the Marines, it is added the federal police transformation under a pattern of intermediate force or security.

The paramilitarization of this coercive government's instrument, finds its genesis the 1st June 2009, when the Federation Official Diary published the Federal Police Law (2009), which principal consequence is the disappearance of the Preventive Federal Police (PFP) and of the Investigations Federal Agency (IFA), as they fusion in one only public security body named precisely Federal Police, and conceived as an administrative organ decentralized from the Federal Public Security (article 2 from the Law). What results paradoxical is that who participated directly in the creation of the PFP and the IFA, and was in charge of the direction of this last one, avoided reaching the necessary maturation process of both institutions, being the responsible of signing his death certificate, when he fusion them in the Federal Police (See: García Luna 2011).

In the same preeminence logic of quantity over quality, Felipe Calderón in his last government inform recognized that:

The force of state of the Federal Police multiplied by 5 passing from 6,489 elements in December 2006, to 36,940 in June 2012, where the 20.2% are women...

(Presidency 2012, Juridical Certainty: 3)

But, with the objective of increasing the number of effectives, it was reduced the temporal horizon of the basic formation course, from 1 year to 3 months, as I had opportunity to confirm during several visits to the San Luis Potosi Federal Police Academy through the last 2 years.

Also, it calls attention to the process of recruiting candidates for the federal police, with profiles of the calls 2011 and 2012 are as follows:

- a) Research Profile, aimed at young people 21–36 years old from various top level racing or upper-level university.
- b) Regional Security for young adults 19–28 years of age with a high school level studies.
- c) Federal Forces recruiting oriented youth 18–35 years old with high school. Prison Prevention Officer addressed to applicants 20–40 years old.
- d) Profile for guard (18–49 years of age with basic high school education studies) and escort profile (18–35 year-olds with upper high school education or equivalent).

(Presidency 2012, Police forces, pp. 135–136)

From which it can be concluded that, for candidates to the Research police the limit age is 36 years old, for the candidates to the Federal forces is 35 years old and those who pretend entering to the penitentiary subsystem is 40 and 49 years old, talking about guards and Prison Prevention Officer. These limited ages to enter to the Federal Police contrast with the established by the most successful police models and are based with an old police.

Though probably the most significant is to derail the letter and spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution of the United Mexican States, which literally reads: “Public security institutions will be civil, disciplined and professional.”

And, as highlighted above, federal police responding to a paramilitary force profile, intermediate or militarized (*gendarmerie*), being together with Colombia’s national police, the helicopters operate only in “Black Hawk” gifted M-60 machine gun, considered reserved and exclusive use of the armed forces. To which are added, via Plan Merida:

- Six UH-M60 and 1,340 parts to maintain the reliability and safety of aircraft operations and maintenance of the fleet in top condition.
- A satellite dish attached to the intelligence operation Dornier aircraft.

(Chair 2012, International Cooperation, p. 98)

This is recognized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2012, p. 396), to include federal police as a paramilitary force, suitable as a reserve for a possible armed conflict. In other words, in the militarization of the public security force recently created whose profile it approaches the mold of a *gendarmerie* or intermediate strength.

AS A MANNER OF CONCLUSIONS: NATIONAL STRATEGY BALANCES OF SECURITY AND THE ARMED FORCE’S PERFORMANCE IN MEXICO FROM 2006 TO 2012

According to estimations made by Leticia Ramírez de Alba, who had made the Visible and Invisible Victims Index (VIVI) for serious crimes reported earlier this year by the organization *Mexico Evalúa*, the hard data show a hard reality: 88,361 intentional homicides in the country during Felipe Calderón’s government. (Proceso Magazine 2012); for which is worth asking, how much does the human life value? Or, what is the value of the human life?

In this framework, first, from 2006 to date, there is an increase in spending unparalleled in the security and defense items, from 82,917.6 to 190,061.0 (Presidency 2012, Statistical Annex, p. 69; figures in millions of pesos) and secondly, to be posted violent deaths over the last six years. This increase, in absolute numbers and rate per 100,000 inhabitants, of intentional homicide, should be added the qualitative change of the hand of the paramilitary phenomenon. We refer to the mutilations, beheadings and, in general, to the obvious signs of

torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment which tend to the bodies of the victims. Perhaps, these massive defections meet the SEDENA (Army & Air Force) and SEMAR (Navy), particularly former members of special operations forces who have migrated to the ranks of organized crime; paradox the corollary would be that the state is largely, responsible for the construction of violence in Mexico.

The Sixth Government Report (Presidency 2012, Defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity, p. 89), presents this way the desertion index in the Army and in the Air Force:

From 1st December 2006 to 30 June 2012 it were accumulated a total of 43,827 cases of desertion that represents a decreased of the 59.1% comparing with the 107, 158 cases presented in Administration 2000–2006.

In the SEMAR, from September 2011 to June 2012, were dismissed because for unreasonably causes missed three days, 384 naval elements, 16.2% less compared to 458 elements dismissed in the period before. Also, from January 2007 to June 2012 were 4,660 dismissed elements for the same reason, 53.5% less compared to the 10,027 in the same past period...

Therefore, a little more than 44,000 militaries, marines and sailors deserted through almost the six years of the present administration, number that results unacceptable and that shows the incapacity of the SEDENA and SEMAR in retaining the personal. One wonders why does the current administration put so many efforts increasing by 20,000 the army's effectives, while during the same period, more than twice decided to leave the ranks.

In the most recent report from Felipe Calderón, it is recognized the risk of deserters' migration to the drug dealer's ranks, new offenses incorporated in the regulatory framework of its own, namely: (Presidency 2012, Procurement and administration of justice, pp.16 and 17):

Law for which it is added the Chapter IV Bis, to the Eighth Title from the Second Military Justice Code, adding the articles 275 Bis and 275 Ter, published the 16th November 2011. It creates new penal types in the Military Justice Code, with the end of inhibit the participation of member of the Armed Forces in the organized delinquency.

(Presidency 2012 , Procurement and administration of justice, pp.16–17)

Thus, the commitment of the Chief Executive of the Federation to institutionalized violence, by the strategy which favors the direct-action mode in terms of the essayist André Beaufre (1974, pp. 127–129), by directly engaging members of the armed forces in the war on drugs, also brought with it unwanted effects in military institutions themselves, by being overexposed and intended to confront drug trafficking.

But is the social tissue the one who had resented the most the use of military power as *first ratio*; the imposition of exception measures in the legality margin, had generated uncertainty that is far in consolidating the democratic rule of law. Rather, during the current presidential term, helplessness citizen is

given, both by rising crime rates, as for the discretionary use of force by the state. This explains the refusal of the majority to national anti-drug strategy of the current president, the final verdict of the ballot box is the best proof that if in anything exist social cohesion in Mexico, is in the need to put a halt to the various manifestations of violence, including government and find other different mechanisms.

In this context, almost a decade ago, the United Nations warned about the relationship between justice and military functions in the following way:

The separation between the military functions and the justice is an exigency of every democratic society [the] risk of [military's] undue interference in the justice system is manifested (...) in the persecution of drug trafficking crimes (...) This situation had been observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, which has recommended the Mexican government to avoid military delegate to the fight against crime.

(Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2003, p. 36)

When we declare that the costs dimensions must be considerate a critical affair, we want to highlight – once more – the absence of self-criticism in President Calderón; rather, we are faced with a speech by far optimistic, that contrast to the recent election against their political party.

From where, the popular will chose a change; same which – in security matter as public politic – asks for a transformation in design and execution of politics, in strategies and action lines, based in a diagnosis and in the own capacities of the Mexican State; that bets for a genetic code based in selectivity, through modern intelligence systems, and in the quality instead of the quantity, especially in the qualitative non material elements.

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NARODOWA STRATEGIA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA I DZIAŁANIA SIŁ ZBROJNYCH MEKSYKU W LATACH 2006–2012

Streszczenie. W artykule przedmiotem analizy jest krytyczna ocena narodowej strategii bezpieczeństwa przyjętej w okresie prezydentury byłego prezydenta Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, urzędującego w latach 2006–2012. Przedmiotem analizy są także podejmowane w tym okresie działania sił zbrojnych Meksyku przeciwko zjawisku handlu narkotykami.

Słowa kluczowe: Narodowa Strategia Bezpieczeństwa, siły zbrojne, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, Meksyk