

WITHIN IMAGINATION OR ON THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION PROCESSES ON DEMOCRACY

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Summary. With the collapse of great ideologies in the form of fascism, nazism or communism, the concept of globalization turned into an ideology. Although globalization as such is an objective fact, yet at the axiological level it can be perceived as another utopia which, consequently, needs to be demystified. Two approaches to globalization can be roughly distinguished: narrow and extensive. The former, also called economic, reserves the concept in question exclusively for the economic sphere. Extending globalization to other dimensions of our life is regarded as unjustified. The latter refers to the cultural level, showing the multi-dimensionality of globalization as such, and producing many controversies at the same time. The multi-layered and multidimensional structure of globalization makes it difficult to rightly perceive it and to explicitly determine its consequences from the standpoint of various spheres of social life. The consequences perceived – whether real or imaginary – relate to the axiological dimension. That is why they are applauded or criticized. To the supporters of globalization, it appears as a special set of instruments and mechanism that we can use to attain our own goals if only we wish to. The attempt to reconstruct the mechanisms governing globalization processes is connected here with the search for opportunities to utilize them. The reward for using them is as high as severe is the punishment for refraining from such actions. The attitude to democracy and democratic transformations has a pragmatic dimension. Opponents of globalization are convinced that regardless of the democratic system, the rules of the game are imposed by powerful and anonymous markets and transnational corporations. That is why they offer various proposals for democratization of the global order. The outcome of globalization processes is a new policy, whose determinants were presented by M. Castells. The issue is the politics of identity, which is both local and global, not reducible to simple class affiliations, and able to grasp and express cultural changes. The crisis of democracy is a fact: traditional political parties are being weakened by global trends, there is a growing importance of politics of identity, and the electorate is growing more and more skeptical of professional politicians, who are perceived as corrupt and ineffectual in solving many important problems. Globalization processes reveal and at the same time heighten the contradictions, which liberal democracy necessarily carries with it. In response to these, more or less utopian models of democracy on a global scale appeared.

Key words: democracy, models of global democracy, globalization, new politics

When I was going to the sea-side I was given many pieces of advice. One of them said that the best established way of fishing is the flood and its end. That everything is given on a silver plate then. And the sooner you repeat the process, the larger the catch.

Ilse Aichinger *Subtexte*

INTRODUCTION

In one of his books, Thomas L. Friedman says that imagination has never been more important than now, because in the flat world many tools serving cooperation have become a commodity available to everyone. Today, many more people than before can make their own communications and place them on the Internet. One thing will never be a commodity, and this is imagination – that which is the fulfillment of our dreams.¹ By showing examples, which apply both to the past and the present, he argues that individual imagination previously caused problems to those governing within the more centralized state (it is symptomatic that he refers to the examples of totalitarian states, such as Maoist China, the Stalinist Soviet Union or Nazi Germany), but at present it can threaten other people. That is why it is essential, he believes, to stimulate positive dreams. In other words, we have expectation of cooperation, elimination of alienation, and inclusion instead of exclusion. As Claudio Magris aptly observed: a man plagued by anxiety escapes into the future because in its rush to the future, life incessantly burns the acute burden of its substance in order to change into immaterial essence, which knows no suffering.² Jan Szomburg speaks of the lack of civilizational-developmental lodestar.³ The reason for this is, *inter alia*, the so-called tunnel thinking of both individuals and social groups that communicate within their own circles.

The above-quoted Claudio Magris seems to deplore the fact that the collapse of communism is often perceived not only as the end of real socialism but also of the idea of democracy and progress.⁴ Consequently, all ambitions to stop injustices are pushed aside. He also observes that the end of the myth of Revolution and the Grand Design should after all give greater power to the ideals of justice, which this myth expressed on such a grand scale, but distorted them by absolutization and instrumental treatment; it should have exhibited more pa-

¹ T.L. Friedman, *Świat jest płaski. Krótka historia XXI wieku* [The World Is Flat. A Brief History of the XXI Century] transl. by T. Hornowski, Poznań 2006, p. 550.

² C. Magris, *Szkoda, że jutro nie jest już dziś* [It's a pity, that tomorrow is not today] „Literatura na Świecie” 2001, no. 2–3, p. 187.

³ J. Szomburg, *Rozwój przez wspólnotę i konkurencyjność* [Development through Community and Competitiveness] [in:] *Rozwój przez wspólnotę i konkurencyjność (tezy – streszczenia wystąpień – artykuły towarzyszące)* [...] (Theses – Summaries of Reports – Accompanying Articles)] Gdańsk 2007, p. 14.

⁴ C. Magris, *Utopia i odczarowanie* [Utopia e disincanto] „Literatura na Świecie” 2001, no. 2–3, p. 219.

tience and persistence, which could have made these ideals more likely to be realized according to human standards, or in a relative and imperfect way, yet striving after perfection.⁵ This observation prompts several reflections. First, although reference to the idea of democracy in this context – as Magris does – may appear somewhat strange, we should nevertheless observe that democracy as such is losing its causative power. Probably the last person who believed in such power of democracy on a global scale was Francis Fukuyama. Second, the concept of democracy is usually connected with the concept of justice understood, naturally, in many different ways. Third, we should emphasize these attributes: relative, imperfect, and striving after perfection. They place the line of reasoning in the proper dimension. However, they leave us unsatisfied and prompt us to seek new ideals and new utopias. It is in the same spirit that I interpret another idea of Magris's that the end and beginning of the millennium need utopia but also demystification at the same time.⁶ They fit with the objective of the present paper, which is an attempt to examine democracy, above all at the theoretical level, and at the same time to verify beliefs about it, formulated under the impact of challenges of globalization.

In the ongoing debate devoted both to the problems of democracy and globalization I can see some helplessness.⁷ It relates, I believe, both to scientists, columnists, and politicians. They are trying to use various requisites and instruments to describe and understand the essence of the phenomena in question. What I term globalization, others regard as identical with globalism or even universalization. It should be emphasized that with the collapse of great ideologies in the form of fascism, Nazism or communism, the concept of globalization turned into an ideology, with the result that both individuals and whole communities are divided into its staunch supporters and vehement opponents. This fact alone supports the thesis that globalization cannot be confined to economic problems. We should observe, nevertheless, that it is in the economic sphere that it (globalization) is easiest to notice and assess. Although globalization as such is an objective fact, yet at the axiological level it can be perceived as another utopia which

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 220.

⁷ For more on this subject, see my other studies. M. Marczevska-Rytko, *Demokracja bezpośrednia w teorii i praktyce politycznej* [Direct Democracy in Theory and Practice], Lublin 2001; M. Marczevska-Rytko, *Demokracja jako ustrój możliwości. Czesław Żnamierowski's poszukiwanie ideału demokracji* [Democracy as a System of Opportunities. Czesław Żnamierowski's Search for the Ideal of Democracy], „Przegląd Polityczny” 2003, no. 4, pp. 63–72; M. Marczevska-Rytko, *Wolność i jej ograniczenia jako podstawa dyskursu demokratycznego* [Freedom and Its constraints as the Basis for Democratic Discourse] [in:] *Kulturowe instrumentarium wolności. Dziennikarstwo, Internet, rynek* [The Cultural Instruments of Freedom. Journalism, Internet, the Market], (ed.) R. Paradowski, Poznań 2004, pp. 13–24; M. Marczevska-Rytko, *Procesy globalizacji jako wyzwanie dla kultury i państwa narodowego* [Globalization Processes as a Challenge to Culture and Nation-State] [in:] *Naród, kultura i państwo w procesie globalizacji* [Nation, Culture and State in the Process of Globalization] (eds) M. Banaś, J. Rokicki, Kraków 2005; M. Marczevska-Rytko, *Współczesny dyskurs demokratyczny* [Contemporary Democratic Discourse] [in:] *Sfera publiczna. Kondycja – przejawy – przemiany* [The Public Sphere. Its Condition – Manifestations – Transformations] (eds) J.P. Hudzik, W. Woźniak, Lublin 2006, pp. 45–62.

needs therefore to be demystified. In my current research I concluded that the application of Popper's conception of spotlight illuminating only a fragment of complex globalization processes prevents their whole complexity from being understood. Two approaches to globalization can be roughly distinguished: narrow and extensive.⁸ The former, also called economic, reserves the concept in question exclusively for the economic sphere. Extending globalization to other dimensions of our life is regarded as unjustified. The latter refers to the cultural level, showing the multi-dimensionality of globalization as such. It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of controversies relates to the latter approach.

It is therefore legitimate to ask what globalization is and what it brings with it. The answers to these questions are many. First of all, we should say that we are dealing with answers relating to a lower or higher level of abstraction. Take some examples. When defining globalization Martin Albrow says that these are processes, in consequence of which world nations are included in one global society.⁹ Similarly, Ronald Robertson maintains that this is a complex of processes that make up a common world.¹⁰ Anthony Giddens, in turn, defines globalization as the process of extending social, economic, political or cultural relations over the whole globe.¹¹ Therefore, we can speak of some kind of feedback when local events are influenced by events that take place in a different part of the world and the former in turn influence the latter. Giddens warns us against the misapprehension of the concept of globalization as (chiefly economic) relations literally encompassing the whole world. He maintains that globalization does not, by any means or first of all, relate exclusively to economic interrelationships but to the transformation of time and space in our life. Remote events, economic and not only, affect us more directly and swiftly than ever before. And conversely, decisions that we make as individuals frequently have global implications.¹² To his aid comes Michael A. Casey, who, having analyzed various reasons and opinions, observes how significant is the impact of globalization on culture and society. He concludes that this question proved more important than the problem of economic influences of globalization.¹³ The foregoing reflec-

⁸ Individual scholars use different concepts. For example, Marek Pietraś speaks of globalization paths (M. Pietraś, *Globalizacja jako proces zmiany społeczności międzynarodowej* [Globalization as a Process of Change of the International Community] [in:] *Oblicza procesów globalizacji* [Faces of Globalization] (ed.) M. Pietraś, Lublin 2002, pp. 35–66), Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński uses the term arenas of globalization (E. Wnuk-Lipiński, *Świat międzyepoki* [The World of Interepoch] Krakow 2005).

⁹ M. Albrow, *Introduction* [in:] *Globalization, Knowledge and Society*, (eds) M. Albrow, E. King, London 1990, p. 9; M. Albrow, *Globalization* [in:] *The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought*, (eds) W. Outhwaite, T. Bottom, Oxford 1993, pp. 248–249.

¹⁰ R. Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*, London 1992, p. 396. See: R. Robertson, *Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept*, [in:] *Global Culture, Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity*, (ed.) M. Featherstone, London 1990, pp. 15–30; R. Robertson, H.-H. Khondker, *Discourses of Globalization: Preliminary Considerations*, „International Sociology” 1998, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 25–40.

¹¹ A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge 1990, p. 64 et seq.

¹² A. Giddens, *Trzecia droga. Odnowa socjaldemokracji* [The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy] translated by H. Jankowska, Warsaw 1999, p. 33.

¹³ M.A. Casey, *Jak rozumieć globalizację* [How To think about Globalization] „Ethos. Kwartalnik Instytutu Jana Pawła II [Quarterly of John Paul II Institute, KUL – Lublin and John Paul II Foundation – Rome”

tions, by no means exhaustive, convince us that the multi-layered and multidimensional structure of globalization makes it difficult to rightly perceive it and to explicitly determine its consequences from the standpoint of various spheres of social life. The consequences perceived – whether real or imaginary – relate to the axiological dimension. That is why they are applauded or rejected.

GLORIFICATION OF GLOBALIZATION

To the supporters of globalization, it appears as a special set of instruments and mechanisms that we can use to attain our own goals if only we wish to. One of the staunch advocates of globalization is aforementioned T.L. Friedman. It is my conviction that he brilliantly presented the structure of complex globalization processes, at the same time indicating the ambivalence of its effects.¹⁴ There is no need to go into detail about Friedman's conception at the point. What is essential is that we are witnessing a new power structure developing, based upon three elements: a balance between nation-states, a balance between states and global markets, and a balance between the individual and the state. These are its main determinants: first, it is the significant role played by the United States.¹⁵ The earlier ambivalent attitude towards this state has become more pronounced. The notion of Americanization often appears as synonymous with globalization. Second, on the international political scene, the importance of millions of investors is growing, described by Friedman as the Electronic Herd, who are able, owing to the highly developed computer network, to transfer their capital from one place on the globe to another with one click of the mouse.¹⁶ Two investor

2002, no. 59–60, p. 219. Compare: S. Tokarski, *Westernizacja, easternizacja, globalizacja – trudności reorientacji w nowoczesnej czasoprzestrzeni kulturowej* [Westernization, Easternization, Globalization – Difficulties of Re-orientation in the Modern Cultural Space-time [in:] *Kultury pozaeuropejskie i globalizacja* [Non-European Cultures and Globalization] (ed.) J. Zdanowski, Warsaw 2000, pp. 31–47.

¹⁴ T.L. Friedman, *Lexus i drzewo oliwne. Zrozumieć globalizację* [The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Understanding Globalization] translated by T. Hornowski, Poznań 2001.

¹⁵ The United States appear to be the new empire of the era of globalization processes. After Tomasz Gabiś we can observe that 'former sovereign nation-states waged wars outside the country, and inside they carried out policing operations. The empire does not wage wars because it does not have an outside enemy, it conducts policing and repressive operations. (...) Destruction of the logistics bases of the rebels and pacification of a province is only a small part of the global 'war on terror' declared by the Empire, the war without fronts, war against Evil, whose objective is thus not limited spatially and the attainment of it may never come because, as President Bush said, what is at stake is the final and complete victory, and to win such a victory can take eternity to attain (Eternal War for the sake of Eternal Peace)'. T. Gabiś, *Imperium Mundi jako polityczna forma globalizacji* [Imperium Mundi as a Political Form of Globalization] [in:] *Globalizacja i my. Tożsamość lokalna wobec trendów globalnych* [Globalization and Us. Local Identity vis-à-vis Global Trends], (eds) R. Piekarski, M. Graban, Krakow 2003, pp. 146–147.

¹⁶ In this context we should refer to the statement of Andrzej Gwiazda, who observes that „in the past nation-states and local communities were able to control their fate, whereas in the present age of globalization there is an increasingly greater rift between the state and economy. Globalization, understood here first of all as the concentration of enormous economic power in the hands of transnational corporations, caused, among other things, more and more difficulties for the states in the provision of current social benefits (...)”. A. Gwiazda, *Globalizacja a erozja władzy państwa narodowego* [Globalization and Erosion of the Power of Nation-State] „Przegląd Politologiczny” 2002, no. 2, p. 102.

groups can be distinguished among them. One deals with investments on a short-term basis. The other is composed of international corporations, which usually invest their capital in a state for a longer term. The main financial centers of this group of actors on the political scene are Wall Street, Hong Kong, London, or Frankfurt. It appears that it is difficult to overestimate the impact of activities of the Electronic Herd on the functioning of states and the international system. Third, thanks to knocking down of the walls dividing the states and systems, and to the information revolution, individuals have redoubled influence on the course of affairs without the intermediation of the state. Friedman uses the term of superenhanced individual. In his next book he treats this dimension of globalization processes as one of utmost importance, prognosticating that in the next globalization wave (which he calls Globalization 3) its driving force will increasingly be individuals, more and more diversified in respect of descent – not only Western people and not only those of the white race.¹⁷ Which is why it is so vital to ask and answer oneself the questions: What is my position in the global competition and how can I use my global capabilities? How far can I cooperate with other people in the world?¹⁸ Fourth, individual states have an alternative: they can put on the so-called Golden Straitjacket or not. Friedman says that it is the only attire of the globalization era showing that a given state discerns the rules governing the free market and submits to them. In the globalization era, it is the quality of the state that actually gains in importance, which denotes the quality of the legal and financial system and the quality of management of the economy.

Observe that the attempt to reconstruct the mechanisms governing globalization processes is connected here with the search for opportunities to utilize them. And the reward for using them may be as high as severe is the punishment for refraining from such actions. What's interesting, the attitude to democracy and democratic transformations has a pragmatic dimension in this context. Democracy is not the principal desirable objective; it is rather an instrument that can have a favorable effect on the creation of the appropriate, predictable environment, where different actors operate. Friedman rightly points out the ambivalent influence of globalization processes on democracy. For, on the one hand, the Electronic Herd forces individual states to introduce transparent democratic rules. To use the information technology language, we can speak of putting in place better operating systems and software. On the other hand, the interaction and influence of the Electronic Herd raises fears associated with the political decision-making center, convincing us that regardless of the democratic system, the rules of the game are imposed by the powerful and anonymous markets and Electronic Herds. Friedman astutely states that the Electronic Herd does not get into a country because it values democracy per se. It does not. The Electronic

¹⁷ T.L. Friedman, *Świat jest płaski...*, p. 21.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

Herd values stability, predictability, transparency, and the ability of the state to protect private property against arbitrary or criminal confiscation. In order to achieve this, the Electronic Herd expects the developing countries to put in place better software, operating systems and governance or the basic building blocks to democracy.¹⁹ Nevertheless, as Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński observes, we are dealing now with a difficult-to-solve dilemma, which results, in the global dimension, in that 'economic Darwinism (...) is not stopped in any significant way by political process because on the global political arena no power structures with democratic legitimacy developed, which could counterbalance global economic structures and impose on them the rules of the game adopted by democratic procedure'.²⁰

CRITICISM OF GLOBALIZATION

The situation presented above provokes criticism aimed at capitalism. This is expressed *inter alia* by raising social issues, and appealing to the principle of solidarity or the common good. Criticism is leveled, among others, by representatives of liberal ideas. George Soros draws attention to three interconnected problems: the negative assessment of the present American Administration (he even goes as far as to claim that the attacks of 2001 were a pretext for George Bush to force through the present US foreign policy), deficiencies of the world capitalist system, and the constructive vision, whose goal is to improve the world order.²¹ The classic of British liberalism, John Gray speaks in a similar vein, criticizing economic globalization.²² He perceives the global free market – one of the fundamental concepts of globalization – as a kind of new utopia after the collapse of the systems of so-called real socialism. This would mean that the world abhors vacuum and in this case it is filled with new visions. Gray emphasizes numerous similarities that he discerns between Marxism and the liberal market philosophy. Among others, he points out that the individual is perceived in economic terms. The aim of the individual's life and the functioning of whole societies is, as it were, to strive for modernity. The idea of free market and individual values are the foundations of the system that Gray criticizes: one that, he believes, fell apart after the tragic disaster of 11 September 2001.

¹⁹ T.L. Friedman, *Lexus...*, p. 217.

²⁰ E. Wnuk-Lipiński, *op. cit.* p. 97.

²¹ For example, see two books by this author, although the problems indicated are also discussed in other publications: G. Soros, *Bąbka amerykańskiej supremacji* [The Bubble of American Supremacy] transl. by D. Chylińska, Krakow 2004; G. Soros, *Nowy okropny świat. Era omylności* [The Age of Fallibility. Consequences of the War on Terror] translated by A. I. J. Maziarscy, Warsaw 2006. We could observe, incidentally, that in his criticism he does not go as far as Noam Chomsky, for example in his work *Hegemonia albo przetrwanie. Amerykańskie dążenie do globalnej dominacji* [Hegemony or Survival. American Quest for Global Dominance] Warsaw 2005.

²² Compare: J. Gray, *The Era of Globalisation is Over*, „New Statesman”, 24 September 2001; J. Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism*, New York 1998.

The drama of globalization lies, in Michael Ehrke's view, in the fall of the oasis of the non-capitalist economic order.²³ We are dealing with a widening gap between those who can transfer their financial reserves and those who cannot do so. In fact, with the development of the information society, the importance of information is growing as compared with labor, capital or raw materials. One can discern the revival of enterprise, emphasis on the value of shares as the objective of activities of a business. One can also discern a new lower class made up of the working poor. One should also pay attention to a new economic consensus, which, Ehrke believes, is a legacy of conservative (neoliberal) government. It comes down to the conviction that it is necessary to avoid inflation and to take measures to counteract an increase in state spending. Ehrke also emphasizes the importance of the process, called individualization, which comes down to the disintegration or destruction of traditions, values, lifestyles, and communities. These factors and processes posed a challenge of seeking new social solutions. They also became a challenge to the existing ideas and conceptions.

Some scholars point to the fact that in practice we are not dealing with only one model of capitalism: among many others in the era of globalization processes, two models command attention: American and European. We may wonder whether the model of capitalism adopted/worked-out as a result of various determinants does not influence the perception of the role of the state or group of states in the international order, and of the rules that govern it. Such conclusions can be prompted for example by Robert Kagan's presentation of the analysis of differences between the United States and Europe after the collapse of the bipolar world order.²⁴ The neo-American model is characterized by individualism, and by the importance of financial markets and stock exchanges.²⁵ The Rhine model, however, is aimed at a consensus between different social groups, at the dominance of banks, and social security. In the face of globalization processes 'the more controversial, less effective and more brutal variety of the two is gaining in influence (...)'.²⁶ This agrees with the assessment by Giuliano Ferrara, political scientist and editor-in-chief of the „II Foglio” daily, who maintains that Europe is slowly adjusting to the American model of liberal and market economic policy.²⁷

The problem seems to come down to the fact that while supporting private enterprise free from government regulations or pressures by trade unions, not constrained by tariff barriers and investment restrictions, burdened by as low

²³ M. Ehrke, *Trzecia Droga a europejska socjaldemokracja* [The Third way and European Social Democracy] [in:] *Spory wokół Nowej Trzeciej Drogi* [Disputes over the New Third Way] selected and edited by T. Kowalik, Warsaw 2001, pp. 45–64.

²⁴ R. Kagan, *Potęga i raj. Ameryka i Europa w nowym porządku świata* [Power and Paradise. America and Europe in the New World Order] transl. by W. Turopolski, Warsaw 2003.

²⁵ M. Albert, *Kapitalizm kontra kapitalizm* [Capitalism versus Capitalism] Krakow 1994, p. 22–25.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 276.

²⁷ *Mniej państwa* [Less State], interview with Giuliano Ferrara by Jacek Pałasiński, „Wprost”, 27 May 2001, pp. 19–20.

taxes as possible, and while advocating privatization of all enterprises that are to bring in profits, followers of turbocapitalism promise the dynamic development of the economy and an increase in wealth, without indicating the distribution of this wealth at the same time.²⁸ I am convinced that it is extremely important to focus attention on the American social, cultural and historical determinants. In a broader context, this would be a question about the advisability of suggesting to each country and each community the same solutions regardless of social and cultural differences. Interestingly enough, the point is not so much the dangers arising from uncritical acceptance of American solutions as imperfect imitation of them. The followers seem to forget about at least two forces that make the majority of American society accept the inconveniences of turbocapitalism.²⁹ These are the following: the legal system functioning in the United States and the system of values characteristic of Calvinism. There is a widely held conviction that no Western government has so far had a better idea but to allow turbocapitalism to develop without restriction, hoping that faster economic growth cures all ills. Unfortunately, all politicians ignore the obvious logical conclusion that turbocapitalism will speed up the division of society into Silicon Valley heroes and the vale of despair.³⁰ Similar critical opinions are expressed by activists and supporters of anti- and alterglobalist movements.

To sum it up, we shall show at least several arguments that are usually referred to:

- Globalization is the source of diversification, it produces the center and the periphery, therefore progress can be attained by few (the democratic center is the source of capital and the periphery is the recipient of it).
- Wealthy countries strive to liberalize the sectors, in which they export.
- Promotion of the free market leads to robbing weaker nations of the wealth they still have.
- Economies in the developing countries are not adapted for participation in the market game (they are not competitive enough and do not have right information).
- Countries trying to acquire financial capital have to accept the conditions of the market game and join world competition.
- Interconnection of economic systems is highly sensitive to disturbance of balance. Destabilization of one financial market resounds all over the world.
- Negative aspects of globalization processes are associated with the lack of concern about sustained social development, the natural environment, human rights, and democracy.
- The role of the nation state has been severely restricted.

²⁸ E. Luttwak, *Turbokapitalizm. Zwycięzcy i przegrani światowej gospodarki* [Turbocapitalism. Winners and Losers in the Global Economy] transl. by E. Kania, Wrocław 2000, p. 42. The way of Luttwak's reasoning can be illustrated with the formula: Privatization + Deregulation + Globalization = Turbocapitalism = Prosperity.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 276.

- The decision-making power passes into the hands of institutions that are not held accountable to the voters and public opinion.
- Globalization in a neoliberal version does not entail democracy.
- The United States are perceived (especially in the dimension of foreign policy) as the state responsible for the present-day model of globalization.
- Transnational corporations are perceived as one of the main actors on the world scene (they enjoy special privileges).
- International organizations play the role of a tool in the hands of rich countries and transnational corporations.
- The International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and the World Bank appear as the co-originators and upholders of today's model of globalization.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES

No wonder therefore that there are various proposals for healing the existing situation. Some authors, like the above-quoted George Soros, seek the key to improve the world situation in the change of the role played by the strongest countries. The United States should accept the role of the world leader with all its consequences. It should therefore try to start cooperation with other countries in the exercise of its duties by active and responsible participation in international organizations. Others emphasize the necessity of citizens exerting pressure on their governments (especially in Europe), so that these would join a political union. If this happens, then we will be well on the way to the United States of Europe with the model which is the best for us and has already started to bear fruit (this is of course the Rhine model). Otherwise 'we will be possessed by the fears of our old Europessimism and will inevitably be sliding towards the neo-American model, the foretaste of which are already the suburbs of Lyon, Manchester, and Naples (...)'³¹

Still others support the restoration of the primacy of politics over economy. Today the state only performs the function of „feeder” in the service of transnational economy while politicians themselves seem only to reduce benefits wherever there are no strong interest groups that can resist such measures.³² Faith is pinned on the power of the United States, perceived as the only country that has preserved considerable national sovereignty and is able to lay down the binding rules of global integration. That is why the United States appears as the last pillar of order in the chaos of global links. The stability of a democratic society is possible when the voters feel and know that rights and interest of anyone are respected, and not just of economic tycoons. Democratic politicians must there-

³¹ M. Albert, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

³² H.-P. Martin, H. Schumann, *Pułapki globalizacji. Atak na demokrację i dobrobyt* [Die Globalisierungsfalle. Der Angriff auf Demokratie und Wohlstand] transl. by M. Zybur, Wrocław 1999, pp. 246–247.

fore adhere to a policy of social compromise and restrict the individual's freedom for the public interest. At the same time, however, if it is to function, the market economy needs freedom of enterprise. It is only the prospect of individual profit that releases the forces which create our wealth through innovation and investment.³³ This proposal shows that a desirable solution would be to introduce the rules of social market economy. We should add that this was one of the main ideas characteristic of ordoliberalism, which guaranteed stability and order in the Federal Republic of Germany for over forty years after the Second World War.

Some authors agree with the conception of globalization plus, which means accepting the needs of global markets, taking into account the principles of social good.³⁴ It would be the result of the thesis that the essence of the open world lies in the unlimited number of possible ways that we follow.³⁵ People approvingly accept the view that the necessity to correct the side effects of the market does not undermine its principle. The point is not therefore that we need to replace 'capitalism' with new forms of economy but to pragmatically lessen its undesired effects. This is necessary both in economy and in politics.³⁶

Proponents of this standpoint found considerable support in the person of Joseph Stiglitz. This Nobel Prize winner in economics in 2001 maintains that globalization should be reconsidered in the domestic dimension of the states and in the international one.³⁷ For that reason it is necessary, *inter alia*, to reject the neoliberal recipe proposed by the International Monetary Fund; change the way of exercising authority in the international financial organizations (equalize the actual rights of member states); introduce transparency and openness in international economic cooperation; determine the field of the game by the World Trade Organization in such a way that developing countries will have real opportunities to compete with developed countries; impose on organizations the duty to inform the public about their work and to be evaluated; take note by financial organizations of the danger associated with the movement of short-term capital and to take measures to protect themselves against such dangers; reform bankruptcy law (in order to prevent the IMF aid from being used to pay off creditors); rely less on partial funding in the case of problems with paying off foreign creditors; improve risk management in the field of exchange rates, social security system and the system of responding to financial crises. Stiglitz seems to share the arguments voiced by Dahrendorf and others regarding taking into consideration the argument of the common interest. They maintain that globalization need not destroy the environment, generate new inequalities or serve the

³³ *Ibidem*, pp. 271–272.

³⁴ R. Dahrendorf, *Nowa pokusa autorytaryzmu* [A New Temptation of Authoritarianism] [in:] *Spory wokół Nowej Trzeciej Drogi...*, p. 42.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 44.

³⁶ R. Dahrendorf, *Kwadratura Trzeciej Drogi* [Squaring the Circle of the Third Way] „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 17–18 July 1999, p. 12.

³⁷ J. Stiglitz, *Wizja sprawiedliwej globalizacji. Propozycje usprawnień* [Making Globalization Work] transl. by A. Szeworski, Warsaw 2007.

interests of corporations at the expense of prosperity of ordinary citizens. What's more, they pin their hopes on the civil, conscious society, which, it seems, is able to do a lot in order to restrict malfeasance on the part of interest groups – corporate and financial.

DETERMINANTS OF NEW POLITICS

The concept of new politics is derived from Manuel Castells's deliberations discussed in the trilogy *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, published in 1996–1998.³⁸ It presented the model of society based on the network, whose essence is the flow of information. The politics based on class and national institutions that legitimize this politics is replaced by the politics of identity, which is both local and global, not reducible to simple class affiliations, and able to grasp and express cultural changes. New social movements, which introduce new forms of political activities, are growing in importance. Present-day politics is obviously focused on the world of the media, because there is only a margin of freedom outside this sphere. That is why the indispensable features of a politician are as follows: a straightforward manner, a convincing tone of voice, well-prepared statements or readiness to address voters on television. Also essential is competence in computer technologies, learning the ability to create an attractive website and to update it regularly, and to have and sort e-lists with instructions from the voters.

Castells gives examples of organizations promoting specific programs (human rights, the problem of poverty or destruction of the environment), which appeal in their activities to the global community, abandoning the language of class solidarity or party loyalty. The political establishment and political parties, as he observes, make efforts to control information policy. It is impossible, however, to exercise effective control because of the complex nature of information networks. Interestingly enough, Castells does not share the conviction that there has been a reputedly significant increase in corruption in the political or economic life, and that politicians are more venal than before. We are rather witnessing, he believes, more and more negative campaigns, where special emphasis is put on scandals.

The crisis of democracy is a fact: traditional political parties are being weakened by global trends, there is a growing importance of the politics of identity combining cultural aspiration and financial matters, the electorate is growing more and more skeptical of professional politicians, who are perceived as corrupt and ineffectual in solving many important problems. Hopes of overcoming

³⁸ M. Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*. Vol. 1: *The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford-Malden 1996; Vol. 2: *The Power of Identity*, Oxford-Malden 1997; Vol. 3: *End of Millennium*, Oxford-Malden 1998.

the crisis of democracy and the skepticism of citizens are sought in the use of e-technologies. They would serve to revive local communities and encourage greater political participation.

It is obvious for Castells that everything that generates authority, money or information is associated with exchange of impulses in the network. For him, one kind of authority is to create and control cultural codes, i.e., ways of our thinking of ourselves and the world around us.³⁹ At the same time he maintains, quite rightly – we might add, that most of us are consumers of those codes. The mass of information or infoglut makes us stop at the stage of consumption. One can conclude from this that when acting in this way we remain continually dependent. The problem of control also arises. For Castells – and for many other scholars – the only positive solution is to rebuild the civil society. The role of the state in this respect has been immensely reduced, which is due to the fact that the state cannot control the Network. The Internet architecture is such that it can be controlled only in one way – by exiting it. If we live in the open network and want to use the benefits of information exchange, we have to sanction it. One's blood may be up, death sentences can be passed but one cannot stop the flow of information.⁴⁰ It should be remembered, though, that information is not identical with knowledge, which Jacques Derrida astutely pointed out during the debate of the UNESCO Executive Council on the issue of building the knowledge society.⁴¹ According to Derrida, knowledge means acceptance of a certain order and the strengthening of identity as a result. He also added that we live in the era of information wars, and information can be treated as an instrument of struggle.

The new politics is largely a derivative of interaction of interconnections between the social sphere and technological sphere, especially the Internet. On the one hand we are dealing with the social impact of the Internet, resulting from its ability to transform communication patterns, or, as M. Castells would have it, to instill cultural codes. On the other hand, the Internet, as any other technology, is a result of interaction by the users. The current development trends allow us to propose a thesis that the future will intensify mutual interactions, and the growing awareness and habits associated with the use of the Internet will overcome many existing barriers.

PROBLEMS WITH DEMOCRACY

We thus come, as it were, to the essence of the problem of liberal democracy. Globalization processes reveal and at the same time heighten these contradictions, which liberal democracy necessarily carries with it. As I demonstrated

³⁹ Wywiad z Castellssem przeprowadzony przez Cliffa Barney'a, [Interview with Castells by Cliff Barney], „Magazyn Sztuki” 2000, no. 24.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ M. Dzieduszycka, *Internet a nasza przyszłość szczęśliwa* [Internet and Our Happy Future] „Odra” 2002, no. 11.

elsewhere, this problem does not seem to preoccupy members of today's societies.⁴² The state of awareness is entirely different: we speak of democracy and liberalism in one go, treating them as something interconnected and inseparable. However, when referring to the evolution of the two concepts and the meanings attributed to them in different eras, we can observe that they were initially treated as alien to each other, impossible to combine or attain within one social order. This problem is reflected *inter alia* in the reflections of Carl Schmitt, who maintains that the faith in parliamentarianism, in government by discussion, belongs to the mental world of liberalism. But it does not belong to democracy. We have to separate liberalism and democracy, in order to get to know this heterogeneously complex product, the culmination of which is modern mass democracy.⁴³ As Giovanni Sartori rightly observed, when we speak of democracy, we often mean liberal democracy and then we emphasize freedom, whereas when we speak simply of democracy we separate it from liberalism and emphasize the principle of equality.⁴⁴ By becoming aware of the changes that must have taken place in both conceptions and at the same time in the way of perceiving the ideal social order so that it would be possible to create a new quality, a special kind of *perpetuum mobile* as Ortega y Gasset would have it, we will be able to understand present-day problems, which we are dealing with in relation to democracy. The evolution of liberalism and democracy has resulted in their connection with each other both on the axiological level and in the sphere of everyday practice. On the one hand, this leads to relative stability because too far-reaching expectations or postulates that disturb the state of balance are rejected: democratic rules are a rein on radical postulates proposed by the liberals and the other way round. On the other hand, the different nature of the two visions keeps making itself felt. We then say that democracy (we mean democracy in its liberal version, of course) does not solve many problems and that there are far better methods of government.

Globalization processes, while producing new possibilities, also give rise to the temptation to use them both in the liberal and democratic spirits (not to mention many others, obviously). I believe that the problem should be examined both at the level of the nation states and on a global scale. Starting from the level of the nation state, we will find that today's discussion on democracy is actually going on between the proponents of the aggregative/aggregate model and the advocates of broadly conceived deliberation.

⁴² M. Marczevska-Rytka, *Liberalizm a demokracja* [Liberalism and Democracy] [in:] *Ideologia, doktryny i ruch polityczny współczesnego liberalizmu* [The Ideology, Doctrines and Political Movement of Contemporary Liberalism], (eds) E. Olszewski, Z. Tymoszek, Lublin 2004, pp. 131–148.

⁴³ C. Schmitt, *Sytuacja historyczna i stan duchowy dzisiejszego parlamentaryzmu* [Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus] [in:] *Konserwatyzm. Projekt teoretyczny* [Conservatism. A Theoretical Project] (ed.) B. Markiewicz, Warsaw 1995, p. 99.

⁴⁴ G. Sartori, *Teoria demokracji* [Theory of Democracy] transl. by P. Amsterdamski, D. Grinberg, Warsaw 1994, p. 450.

Aggregative/aggregate democracy is associated with Joseph Schumpeter's reflections: he concluded that the democratic system is better identified in terms of institutions and procedures than in terms of ideals that democracy should serve and sources of authority. We should therefore reject the definition of democracy in terms of the will of the people (the source of authority) or the good of the society (the goal of those governing). Schumpeter emphasizes that the role of the people lies in selecting the government or some other intermediate body, which will in turn choose the executive branch at the national level or the government; the democratic method is an institutional solution of arriving at political decisions, in which individuals gain the decision-making power through competition for votes.⁴⁵ The basis of the democratic system thus understood is the elections – in which at least two political parties contend, showing alternative programs – and the majority principle a decisive factor in legitimizing the adopted solutions concerning the process of political decision-making. The minority should focus on activities that will allow them to become a majority in the future.

Deliberative/deliberation democracy would, in turn, come down roughly to the application of the rule that political decisions are made in the process of discussion held by free and equal citizens. Its objective is to reach a consensus going beyond the agreement on the application of specific procedures. It is assumed here that people's viewpoint on the solution of a given problem will be modified in the process of deliberation. At the same time it is pointed out that in the course of such deliberation people will become aware of or work out a common interest. The flourishing of this formula of democracy is associated with the studies by such thinkers as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. There is no room here to present the assumptions of their theories. It should be emphasized, however, that striving to reach a consensus alone is most often presented as a value in itself, something that is the opposite of confrontation and rivalry, perceived as largely negative phenomena.

It should be acknowledged that the many conceptions of deliberative/deliberation democracy stem from the need to stop the growing disillusionment with democratic institutions. However, limitations of deliberation as a way of problem solving are accentuated more and more often just as weaknesses of procedural democracy that were pointed out earlier. One of the essential weaknesses of deliberation is – as Chantal Mouffe terms it – the escape from plurality.⁴⁶ In other words, this author is convinced that the task of democracy is not to strive to reach a consensus accepted by all political forces but to give a civilized form to conflicting interests. When focusing on working out a consensus, we necessarily appeal to the rationality of individual actors. The outcome of consensus-making deliberation may be the lack of representation of the excluded inter-

⁴⁵ J.A. Schumpeter, *Kapitalizm. Socjalizm. Demokracja* [Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy] transl. by M. Rusiński, Warsaw 1995, pp. 336–337.

⁴⁶ C. Mouffe, *Paradoks demokracji* [The Democratic Paradox] transl. by W. Jach, M. Kamińska, A. Orzechowski, Wrocław 2005, p. 107.

est groups, especially if their postulates are treated as too radical. This may *inter alia* be the reason why populism and its influence are growing in importance, and consequently, why the role of populist parties is growing on the European political scene, which started in the mid-nineteen-eighties.⁴⁷

Taking a distanced view of deliberation, Ian Shapiro rather suggests that wherever possible social life should be molded in such a way that people themselves find stimuli to democratizing it by creating mechanisms guaranteeing that those who have any authority in social relations should be accountable to those who exercise this authority. Where it is not possible to attain this, the government's intervention is justified, and one of the major challenges which appears here is the competent adjustment of the extent of intervention to the actual threat of dominance⁴⁸. The aforesaid author believes that the sources of dominance can be seen both inside and outside the system.

It appears that at the time of intensification of globalization processes the importance of inside sources of dominance increases. For Shapiro, democracy means the management of power relations in such a way as to restrict dominance. From this standpoint, the voices of all those who demand that actions be aimed at limiting (if not eliminating) that which Wnuk-Lipiński terms global economic Darwinism would become part of the process of democracy perceived as the elimination of dominance. Wnuk-Lipiński rightly draws attention to one of the consequences of globalization, which is limiting the individuals acting in the role of citizens. It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that scholars preoccupied with democratic theory had already indicated problems in dealing with this dimension, which was reflected *inter alia* in Robert Dahl's studies. That is why Shapiro suggests that in the decision-making process we should rather refer to the principle of connected interest and enhance the position of those whose basic interests are most threatened under given circumstances.⁴⁹

Problems also arise with the consequences of the answer to the question about the universal dimension of liberal democracy. If the answer is in the affirmative, then it should apply to everyone regardless of his/her civilizational and cultural circle. With the answer in the negative, we should conclude that liberal-democratic solutions are one of the forms of a just social order. Many scholars appear to doubt in the universal character of the Western model and in the domination of Western culture. What is significant, however, are constant choices made as part of the political decision-making process. The point would

⁴⁷ Compare: M. Marczevska-Rytka, *Nowy populizm w perspektywie europejskiej – wymiar ideowo-instytucjonalny* [New Populism in the European Perspective – the Ideological-Institutional Dimension], [in:] *Europejska myśl polityczna wobec globalizacji. Tradycja i wyzwania współczesności* [European Political Thought vis-a-vis Globalization. Tradition and Contemporary Challenges], (eds) J. Sobczak, R. Bäcker, Łódź 2005, pp. 327–340; *Populizm na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. Panaceum czy pułapka dla współczesnych społeczeństw?* [Populism on the Turn of the 20th/21st Century. The Panacea or Trap for Contemporary Societies?] (ed.) M. Marczevska-Rytka, Toruń 2006.

⁴⁸ I. Shapiro, *Stan teorii demokracji* [The State of Democratic Theory] transl. by I. Kisilowska, Warsaw 2006, p. 6.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 197.

therefore be not so much to agree with the political argument of any party to the conflict as to reach a political compromise. Conflict is treated here as a natural state of society, and the models that reject conflicts and divisions should be treated as utopias. One of the more eminent advocates of this view – John Gray – emphasizes the fact of minimizing the consensus in the liberal social system. Mutual coexistence of citizens in such a system is not, according to Gray, determined by subscribing to the same values. It is determined, however, by communicating and coming to an agreement on many different matters. This mechanism also covers the sphere of international relations and, as Gray claims, it is sometimes necessary and applies not only to specific procedures and institutions but also to values. But this is still a matter of practical choice and depends on the circumstances, and on what danger we want to avoid.⁵⁰ Gray appears as a pragmatist, who observes that although it is necessary to respect and strengthen human rights, yet one should not make long-term plans to build some universal morality on this foundation.

Samuel P. Huntington sees this problem in a broader perspective, defined at the same time by the theses of his *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. He ascertains the fact that values characteristic of democracy are not universal. He also stresses the significance of the fact that democracy arose in the individualist culture, whereas the East, which does not have such culture, developed non-liberal forms of democracy. Consequently, the chosen governments can act in a very arbitrary way. All power is concentrated in the hands of executive bodies, police violates human rights and individual freedoms, torture is applied, and there is censorship and control of the press.⁵¹ Huntington rightly observes that the adoption of the principle of appointing the authorities through election does not make a country a Western state. That is why the Western leaders should, he believes, refrain from trying to mold other civilizations in the West's likeness. What's more, the principle of refrainment is, in his view, a necessary requirement to maintain peace in the multi-polar and multi-civilization world.

MODELS OF GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

Observe that we can speak of three approaches to the problem of democracy on a global scale: rejection of democracy as a concept attributed to the nation state; adoption of the democratic model with a reservation that we are dealing with a deficit of democracy; and treatment of the democratic model as fully de-

⁵⁰ Rozmowa z Johnem Grayem. *Życie jest bardziej złożone niż tradycyjna etyka* [An Interview with John Gray. Life is more complicated than traditional ethics] [in:] B. Wildstein, *Profile wieku* [Profiles of Century], Warsaw 2000, p. 176.

⁵¹ Rozmowa z Samuelem Huntingtonem, *Jesteśmy skazani na konflikt cywilizacji* [Interview with Samuel Huntington. We are doomed to a conflict of civilizations] [in:] *Ibidem*, p. 25.

veloped on the supranational and supra-state levels. The traditional concept of democracy is attributed to the state and it defines the principles of internal policy.⁵² 'The sphere of international relations' – write Edward Haliżak and Dariusz Popławski – 'was and is still perceived as a field, in which democracy cannot be applied because of the nature of the international system. For it is characterized by the lack of a superior authority (world government) and by decentralization or even anarchy because of the dominance of the national interest of the states as the chief principle in relations with other states'.⁵³ We could at best speak here of democratism understood as a characteristic trait of relations in the international sphere. Taking the historical context into consideration, such an interpretation of democracy is reserved for the static perception of the international sphere, and only in reference to the past. Nevertheless it should be noted that the transition from the democracy of the Athenian *polis* to democracy as part of nation states was a special kind of revolution in comparison with the existing solutions. It appears that globalization processes will force a revision of the current views on democracy. For example, Haliżak says: 'as long as sovereignty is absolutized without the possibility of restriction, self-restriction or transfer to other supranational bodies, it is impossible to build a system (order) in international relations following the intra-state model.'⁵⁴

Despite the limitations discussed above, more or less utopian models of democracy on a global scale are still constructed. Literature on the subject shows three such models: liberal internationalism, cosmopolitan democracy and the model of radical communitarianism.⁵⁵ Each of these models is an attempt to construct the idea of democracy in a clash with global challenges.

Proponents of the liberal-internationalist model point out the political dimension of globalization processes.⁵⁶ They stress the growing process of narrowing the distance, deepening interrelations, and increasing connections between individual elements of the global world. This leads to the situation in which we function under the conditions of the global village, where we actually are all neighbors. They support the global way of governance in which states, international and non-governmental organizations, and social movements participate. The form of government they regard as desirable is a pluralist system organized in the form of polyarchy.⁵⁷ They opt therefore for the system of reforms adjusting the current system of liberal democracy to global conditions.

⁵²We of course mean the dominant form of democracy – the liberal-democratic system.

⁵³E. Haliżak, D. Popławski, *Wstęp* [Introduction] [in:] *Demokracja w stosunkach międzynarodowych* [Democracy in International Relations] (eds) E. Haliżak, D. Popławski, Warsaw 1997, p. 5.

⁵⁴E. Haliżak, *Demokratyczność systemu międzynarodowego?* [Democraticity of the International System] [in:] *Ibidem*, p. 8.

⁵⁵See: A. McGrew, *Democracy Beyond Borders?* [in:] *The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy*, (ed.) A. MacGrew, Cambridge 1997, pp. 232–241.

⁵⁶*Ibidem*, pp. 242–245.

⁵⁷Reference to R. A. Dahl's conception.

The model of cosmopolitan democracy was presented by David Held.⁵⁸ In his view, in the globalization era, we should focus on the transformation of the nature and expectations associated with democratic community. Political power can no longer be identified with national governments only; it is divided between diverse agencies at the national, regional, and international levels. The idea of common political fate can no longer be placed within the boundaries of an individual nation state, which stems from the fact that some of the most crucial forces and processes affecting the essence of our lives are now beyond the range of a single state. It is difficult to speak of national sovereignty when we are dealing with the influence of the regional or international authority. We are facing a series of new-type problems connected with such relations as: internal and foreign relations, problems of internal policy and external issues; state sovereignty and international determinants. Held's proposed model of cosmopolitan democracy is a challenge to the dominant model of liberal democracy. He supports intervention in the economic sphere, the arguments to which he refers being more of a democratic than egalitarian nature. Regardless of the merits of the model of liberal democracy or any other, the mutual unconditional relation between the political community and the sovereign nation state will not survive any longer. With regard to the model of cosmopolitan democracy we can speak of reconstructing the global system of government towards global democratic governance, in which the decision-making power concerning the most crucial matters would be exercised by all democratic actors. The desirable form of government would be heterarchy.

Supporters of reforming and reconstructing the model of liberal democracy are opposed by all those who believe in the revival of direct democracy. The model of radical communitarianism assumes that governance should be exercised by citizens organized as self-governing communities, the proposed form of government being demarchy.⁵⁹ While the first two models proposed the reform or reconstruction of the liberal democratic system, the system of radical communitarianism is in favor of building alternative structures of global democracy. As B. Barber maintains, at the beginning this will not be a 'world federation' or 'world government' but a more modest undertaking, consisting in laying the foundations of cooperation of citizens on a global scale – the CivWorld, the world of citizens, civil and civilized, and therefore conducive to the creation of supranational forms of citizenship.⁶⁰ It is certain that globalization processes,

⁵⁸ D. Held, *Globalization and Cosmopolitan Democracy*, „Peace Review” 1997, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 309–314; D. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Cambridge 1995; D. Held, *Regulating Globalization? The Reinvention of Politics*, „International Sociology” 2000, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 394–408. See also other studies on the cosmopolitan model: A. Linklater, *Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State*, „European Journal of International Relations” 1996, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 77–103; M. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent*, Cambridge 1996.

⁵⁹ For more, see: J. Burnheim, *Is Democracy Possible?*, Cambridge 1985; J. Burnheim, *Democracy, Nation-states, and the World System* [in:] *New Forms of Democracy*, (eds) D. Held, C. Pollitt, London 1986; J. Burnheim, *Power-Trading and the Environment*, „Environmental Politics” 1995, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 49–65.

⁶⁰ B.R. Barber, *Imperium strachu. Wojna, terroryzm i demokracja* [Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy] transl. by H. Jankowska, Warsaw 2005, pp. 232–233.

or to be precise, electronic revolution, provided new arguments to the proponents of direct democracy.⁶¹ The rapid development of telecommunications undermined the prevalent view, according to which in modern societies only the form of indirect democracy is possible, alternatively enriched with solutions characteristic of direct democracy.⁶² The new technologies cross the barriers that prevent society from directly participating in the decision-making process.⁶³ Thanks to the application of them, it is possible to exceed the current limits of information transfer, to exchange information regardless of time and space, to increase control, which modern hardware users have over the information received, and to decentralize control of the means of telecommunications.

The normative models presented above are obviously the object of discussion in various circles. For some, they are an example of new utopias after the collapse of the Grand Design, for others they are a manifestation of the logical victorious progression from democracy initiated as part of the Greek *polis* through the formula of democracy functioning within the nation state up to its extension over the global community. It appears, however, that while seeing them as a remedy for problems connected with the intensification of globalization processes, and consequently, the weakening of democratic principles and institutions in the present form, we should also take into account their limitations and the social costs that they generate.

In one of his studies Benjamin Barber writes that there is a tendency to regard the merits of democracy as romantic, idealist or even utopian. They may indeed be so. However, in the present era of interrelations where criminals and terrorists know that power does not reside in sovereign states but in gaps between them, democracy has become the wisdom of the realists.⁶⁴ I believe that it is not democracy but imagination that is the wisdom of the realists. It is necessary for all actors who, owing to globalization processes, have gained access to instruments, thanks to which they can influence others, including those thousands of miles away. Globalization as such is a fact, and the opportunities available thanks to it have not been known before. We need imagination to predict not only desirable profits but also unwanted costs. Democracy on a global scale – regardless of the

⁶¹ Cf. M. Marczevska-Rytko, *Procesy globalizacyjne a demokracja bezpośrednia* [in:] *Oblicza procesów globalizacji*, (ed.) M. Pietraś, Lublin 2002, pp. 177–195 also (in English: *Globalisation processes and direct democracy* [in:] *The Faces of Globalization*, (ed.) M. Pietraś, Lublin 2002, pp. 173–190); A. Vandenberg, *Cybercitizenship and Digital Democracy* [in:] *Citizenship and Democracy in a Global Era* (ed.) A. Vandenberg, London 2000, pp. 289–306.

⁶² M. Marczevska-Rytko, *Demokracja elektroniczna jako próba urzeczywistnienia idei greckiej agory* [E-democracy as an Attempt to Realize the Idea of Greek Agora] [in:] *Spółeczeństwo informacyjne: wizja czy rzeczywistość?* [The Information Society: A Vision or Reality?], (ed.) L.H. Haber, vol. II, Krakow 2004, pp. 137–146.

⁶³ A body of arguments was presented by I. Budge in the study: *The New Challenge of Direct Democracy*, Cambridge 1996, pp. 60–61.

⁶⁴ B.R. Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

form it might take – is treated as a cure-all for both the current problems and those produced by globalization. Interestingly enough, both for the advocates of the ideology of globalism and opponents of globalization, democracy is a kind of the New Grand Design (obviously, differently assessed by both sides). I do not claim that solutions of this type have no justification or that they should be rejected outright. I only think that the previous top-down projects aimed at making everyone happy did not yield the expected results while the nation state, despite its enfeebled condition, is doing quite well. Roman Kuźniar indicates another dimension of the problem, stating that ‘the lack of a consistent policy pursued by democratic and non-democratic countries for the democraticity of the international order stems from the fact that nobody actually knows what it would mean in practice on a global scale. There is no agreement about and clarity of the vision of the ends and definition of the means leading to them; to democratize international relations is not the same as to build democracy in the state.’⁶⁵ Perhaps the tunnel way of thinking indicated at the beginning of our discussion could be minimized by the process, which Jerzy Nikitorowicz calls intercultural education.⁶⁶ In place of monoculturalism, the presented standpoint introduces the dialogue of cultures denoting protection on the one hand against globalization and homogenization, and on the other – against local egocentricity. This, however, requires knowledge about other cultural-civilizational circles and the value systems they propagate, and responsible teachers, spiritual leaders, and political activists. Globalization needs to be demystified – both in doing good and producing evil. Friedman’s balancing of the lexis, which symbolizes modernity, modernization, success, progress, and universalization against the olive tree, which symbolizes tradition, deep-rootedness, identity, affiliation, the world that seems to be disappearing under the pressure of the new, may be perceived as a challenge to all those having an ambition to democratize the international order or create global democracy.

Tłum. Jerzy Adamko

⁶⁵ R. Kuźniar, *Demokracja w państwie a demokratyczność porządku międzynarodowego* [Democracy in the State and Democraticity of the International Order] [in:] *Demokracja w stosunkach międzynarodowych...* [Democracy in International Relations...], p. 41.

⁶⁶ J. Nikitorowicz, *Od edukacji regionalnej do międzykulturowej* [From Regional to Intercultural Education] [in:] *Tożsamość, odmiennność, tolerancja a kultura pokoju* [Identity, Difference, Tolerance, and the Culture of Peace] (eds) J. Kłoczowski, S. Łukasiewicz, Lublin 1998, pp. 388–390.