

RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICS AND RELIGION AS A CHALLENGE TO POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

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Summary. The aim of the paper is to show the complexity as well as significance of research into the relations between politics and religion. The paper is divided into three parts. Part One shows examples of interrelations between politics and religion over the centuries, emphasizes the legitimating character of religion from the standpoint of the authority and leadership. Part Two is devoted to the importance of the religious factor in political science research. It discusses the reasons for a comparatively little interest in the religious factor (largely in the aftermath of the French Enlightenment) and presents selected opinions of eminent scholars demanding restoration of the rightful position of this factor in political science research. Part Three distinguishes several essential areas of the political scientist's interest concerning relations between politics and religion. These include inter alia the problem of the cultural-religious level and the search for the place of religion in an integrated Europe; the growing importance of the movements and parties that profess religious fundamentalism in the ideological sphere, especially Muslim fundamentalism; the area of relations between State and Church both in the formal-legal and practical dimensions; the area of mutual relations between religion and democracy.

Key words: politics, religion, political science, fundamentalism, legitimation, democracy, state

People wish to have the ultimate reality just like they themselves are, even if it assumes the form of a capricious tyrant because in the human society children need parental assistance and guidance whereas adults need a guide with whom they are not bound by kinship but by bonds of trust in the higher wisdom and stronger will of the leader.

Arnold Toynbee

Morality, ethics and religion are ways of exercising control, which enable the desire for love to triumph over greed in the perverse human heart.

Daisaku Ikeda

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The purpose of the present article is to show both the complexity and import of research into relations between politics and religion. At the same time it is also a reflection on the problems faced by contemporary political science and

political scientists who take up scholarly investigations. I am convinced that to start research into relations between politics and religion is a considerable challenge to political scientists, which, as I shall seek to show in this paper, they take on with obviously different effects. The paper is divided into three parts. Part One presents examples of interconnections between politics and religion over the centuries, emphasizing the legitimating character of religion from the standpoint of the authority and leadership. Part Two discusses the significance of the religious factor in political science research (reasons for a comparatively little interest in the religious factor are given and selected opinions of eminent scholars are quoted, who demand that proper standing be restored to this factor in political science inquiry). Part Three distinguishes several crucial areas, which are of interest to the political scientist dealing with relations between politics and religion. As a formality, we shall refer to the two title concepts, which, we might add, are of paramount importance to political science and religious investigations. These are politics and religion. In the classic definition of politics formulated by Aristotle, it is the art of ruling the state.¹ It requires knowledge, competence, and psychological predispositions. Its goal is the common good. To refer to the reflections of another classic, Max Weber, we can say that politics means striving to take part in power or influence the division of power both between states and groups of people in a given state.² In this way two dimensions of politics are emphasized: internal (domestic/national) and external (international). At present, attention should be also drawn to the issue of relations of national states with international organizations, and relations between these organizations and also within them. In the Church's social teaching, politics appears as prudent actions for the common good.

Religion tends to be treated as a specific collection of features vested in its historical forms. It is therefore assumed that individual religions arose at specified periods and have their own histories. According to Mircea Eliade, we deal with manifestations of the *sacrum* throughout history and with the ways man contacted with it. This idea is rendered by the following words: „Through the experience of the *sacrum*, the human mind grasped the difference between that which manifests itself as real, powerful, rich and full of meaning and that which is devoid of these qualities: a chaotic and dangerous flow of things, the stream of their accidental and senseless occurrences and disappearances”.³ In another in-

¹ See more: Aristotle, *Polityka* (Politics), transl. and edited by L. Piotrowicz, Warsaw 2002.

² See: M. Weber, *Polityka jako zawód i powołani* (*Politik als Beruf*) Kraków 1998; M. Weber, *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo. Zarys socjologii rozumiejącej* (*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der Verstehenden Soziologie*), transl. by D. Lachowska, Warsaw 2002, pp. 392–394, 452–456, 1032–1034. Compare for example: K. Minogue, *Polityka*, (Politics) transl. by M. Tabin, Warsaw 1997; T. Clancy, *Polityka* (Politics) transl. by T. Hornowski, Poznań 1999; *Metafory polityki* (Political metaphors) (ed.) B. Kaczmarek, vol. 1, Warsaw 2001, vol. 2, Warsaw 2003.

³ M. Eliade, *Historia wierzeń i idei religijnych* (transl. from *Histoire des croyances et des idées religieuses*), vol. 1, Warsaw 1988, p. 1.

terpretation religion is treated as a significant fragment of the social system. For that reason it cannot be understood in isolation from society. Religion is pointed to as an important factor in solving crisis situations and in defense against the conditions of chaos, anomy or alienation. In the theological interpretation religion is a divine phenomenon, it is the revelation of the Absolute or the human answer to manifestations of divinity. The definition of religion here has a normative character.

It should be observed that politics as such belongs to the sphere of the profane, whereas religion to the sphere of the sacred. This does not mean that the two spheres are absolutely separated from each other. On the contrary, throughout history there have been many examples of not only bindings between the two spheres but also overlapping. Formally, the separation of state and religious communities, most often identified with the institution of Church, is found in the European states. We should remember that for centuries God was regarded as the source of authority – a vital pillar of power. This allowed inter alia John of Salisbury to claim that „the prince is public authority and some kind of likeness of the divine majesty on earth. (...) For all authority comes from God (...). Therefore, he who resists the authority resists the arrangement of God”.⁴ This matches the words of St. Paul: „(...) For there is no authority but from God; and the authorities which now are, have been set in their place by God. Therefore he who sets himself against the authority resists the arrangement of God, and they who resist will bring condemnation on themselves.”⁵ This applies to a greater or lesser extent to different cultures and religions. The basic principle determining the functioning of social order was the principle of the divine nature of state authority and thereby the divine nature of the ruler, developed to the highest degree in the Ancient East. „The ruler is either a god himself,” as Henryk Olszewski and Maria Zmierczak observe (one of many, incidentally – with many members of the pantheon, the possibilities of choosing the patron-father were aplenty) „or is a son or a relative of god, or, while not being either, he nevertheless acts in contact with them, as an intermediary between gods and his subjects. He is never an ordinary mortal”.⁶ This position of the ruler in the earthly order determines his characteristics and functions performed. For example, in the first place the ruler takes care of the interest and prosperity of his people, makes sure no harm is done to them, and strives for their affluence. In this way, in relation to his subjects the ruler appears as the high priest, resistance against whom is seen as resistance against Gods. As Jan Baszkiewicz maintains „in [ancient] Egypt, the pharaoh was a god (a son of God Ra, the living Horus), and in Meso-

⁴ John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus* [in:] *Historia idei politycznych. Wybór tekstów* (History of political ideas. Selected texts), vol. 1, Warsaw 2000, p. 169.

⁵ *Biblia Święta* (Holy Bible), Warsaw 1961, p. 170.

⁶ H. Olszewski, M. Zmierczak, *Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych* (History of political and legal doctrines), Poznań 1993, p. 17.

potamia the rulers were only 'great men', intermediaries between gods and people, 'the shadows of god' (the other people are the shadows of the king). For the Jews the ruler was only the God's chosen, his adopted son".⁷ And Baszkiewicz continues:

Emperor Aurelian (270–275 AD) adopted the royal pomp taken over from the Persian models. As early as the first century AD the emperor was treated as divine but only after his death (hence the famous words of the dying emperor Vespasian «Alas, I think I am becoming a god» (*Vae puto, deus fio*). Attempts by Caligula and Domitian to grant a divine status to the living ruler failed, but later the emperor gradually became a living god present on earth (*deus praesens*). Under Aurelian, the idea of the empire's unity (one god, one emperor) was expressed in propagating the solar cult: the world is ruled by the invincible Sun, while the emperor is its emanation on earth.⁸

In the traditional Indian model, the whole social and political order, and consequently its legitimacy, relates to the religious sphere.

The seventeenth century started the process of erosion of the exercise of power based on authority. New liberation conceptions appeared, which shifted the focus on the people, the principles and rules having been contained in the constitutions. These transformations had a significant impact on legitimacy understood as appeal to the religious factor. We should remember that the main elements of religion comprise religious doctrine (the whole of dogmas explaining the questions related to the existence of god and deities, man, the world, and the problems of life and death), cult (a set of activities originating from religious reasons, the purpose of which is to express the worship of a deity, reproduce myths or unite with the absolute), and religious organization (a more or less loose organizational structure). From the point of view of legitimation problems, an important role is played by the religious cult combined with selected elements of the religious doctrine. In his considerations, Le Bon adduces religious feelings, which cover such features as the worship of the supreme being, fear of his power, total obedience, unquestionable acceptance of dogmas and endeavors to spread them, and hostility shown to those who do not recognize the revealed truths.⁹ According to Le Bon, the above mentioned features should be subsumed under religious feelings, regardless of whether they apply to God, a deity, a hero or an idea. He winds up his discussion with the conclusion that „the crowd needs religion. For any views, whether they concern political, social or religious questions, will be accepted by the crowd only when they will have the form of religion, owing to which they will be indisputable”.¹⁰

⁷ J. Baszkiewicz, *Powszechna historia ustrojów państwowych* (World history of state political systems), Gdańsk 1998, p. 10.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

⁹ G. Le Bon, *Psychologia tłumu* (*Psychologie des foules*), Warsaw 1986, p. 87.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 90.

THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

In the contemporary world we notice the growing significance of interrelations between religion and politics and the necessity even of the political scientist relating to them. Meanwhile, the problems of interrelationships between religion and politics are either the object of investigations by religious studies scholars or are on the periphery of interest of political science. Yet the latter has specific instruments, for example a conceptual base, whose instruments allow us to look anew at the emerging problems. We might add that those aspects should be emphasized that must necessarily evade the inspection by a religious studies expert or a sociologist. This remark pertains both to the domestic and international sphere. It should be stated at the same time that the religious factor has not (at least so far) played a considerable role in political science investigations. This situation appears to be changing under the impact of complex reality. Let us point out two phenomena as examples: the problem of the cultural-religious level and the search for the position of religion in an integrating Europe, for instance in connection with debates on the Treaty Establishing the European Constitution, or the growing importance of movements and parties appealing to religious fundamentalism on the ideological level, above all to Muslim fundamentalism. The existing state of affairs in political science investigations is special in that in one form or another, religion has exerted an influence and still does, on the scope of matters related to power and leadership; what is more, even in the systems renouncing religion as such, the sphere of religion has been taken over by the sphere of politics.¹¹

It appears that explanations should be sought in the results of the French Enlightenment. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries went down in history as the period of emergence of new trends in thinking. They led on the one hand to the cult of reason (rationalism), and on the other to fascination with experience (empiricism). It should be observed that underlying the propagated vision was the conviction about the salvation of the world thanks to new inventions and discoveries. There was a widespread belief that the humankind entered the period of progress and happiness. A new trend of thinking emerged, called scientism, which advocated the cult of science understood in a special way, i.e. science reduced to disciplines of natural science. Philosophical considerations, however, were rejected. Religion as such was rejected. It was perceived as „a basically primitive form of explaining phenomena in the world, (...) as false, because inefficient technology: a religious zealot prays to God instead of calling a doctor”.¹² The assumptions characteristic of this manner of thinking can be reduced to

¹¹ For example: M. Marczevska-Rytka, *Rytualizm polityczny* (Political ritualism), „Zeszyty Politologiczne” 2002, no. 4, pp. 120–129.

¹² J.M. Bocheński, *Religia. Dzieła zebrane* (Religion. Collected works) vol. 6, Kraków 1995, p. 12.

several points.¹³ First, it was concluded that science itself has instruments necessary for cognizing and improving the world. Second, science and technology were expected to create a better world and make man more noble and happy. Third, freed from a priori assumptions and dogmas, science would be based on observation and direct experience. Fourth, religious faith was rejected as adducing a priori dogmas, and the matter and universe were recognized as everlasting.

Alfred N. Whitehead believed that scientific discoveries led to formulating philosophical questions, which were tackled by religion in a different way.¹⁴ When confronted with facts, religion is not able to reduce either moral evil in the world or pain and suffering.¹⁵ Nevertheless, it is religion that contributes to direct human experience. This consists, namely, in recognizing the fact that our existence goes beyond the mere sequence of bare facts. Consequently, it is not surprising that scientists call for restoring the proper standing of the religious factor in political science inquiries.

In his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, Samuel P. Huntington raises the problem of religion as a significant factor in international relations in the process of remaking the world order. He proposes a thesis that during the post-cold war period, culture and cultural identity are the main determinants of peace and conflict in the world order.¹⁶ According to this thinker, the universalistic aspirations of Western civilization intensify conflicts with other civilizations. Religion appears here as the basic determinant of civilization. Therefore, it should be observed that such determinants as ideologies or economic potential are losing their importance as compared with cultural differences that are derivative of religious divisions.

Another scholar, Roger Scruton, even claims that Huntington's main thesis was no more credible earlier than it is now.¹⁷ The fundamental question, which Scruton asks, relates to the essence of Western civilization, i.e. a vision of both the society and political order. With the system of values upon which the West is based being contested, Scruton says that if the Western civilization has only freedom to offer, then it is doomed to self-destruction. Moreover, waiving freedom about in the face of religious prohibitions is an act of aggression and runs the risk of retaliations on the part of those whose religious feelings are offended.¹⁸

¹³ Compare: W.W. Bojarski, *Nauka a wiara wczoraj i dziś* (Science and faith today and yesterday), Olsztyn 1990, pp. 16–17.

¹⁴ J. Życiński, *Wprowadzenie* (Introduction) [in:] A.N. Whitehead, *Religia w tworzeniu* (*Religion in the Making*), transl. by A. Szostkiewicz, Kraków 1997, p. 20.

¹⁵ A.N. Whitehead, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹⁶ S.P. Huntington, *Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy kształt ładu światowego* (*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*) transl. by H. Jankowska, Warsaw 1998, p. 14.

¹⁷ R. Scruton, *Zachód i cała reszta. Globalizacja a zagrożenia terrorystyczne* (*The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat*), transl. by T. Bieroń, Poznań 2003, p. 7.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

In their book *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler deplore the fact that the religious factor remains on the periphery of instruments used by scholars to analyze and describe the world on a global scale.¹⁹ They stress that their intention is by no means to replace other factors with the religious one but only to give it its rightful position. They account for the existing situation in scholarly studies, especially on international relations, by the fact that the main theories arose in the Western countries, where, necessarily, the religious factor did not play a significant role.

The explanation for the existing state of affairs – proposed by Fox and Sandler – should be broadened and it should be emphasized that in the Central and Eastern European countries this was a political choice, which translated onto the other levels of man's functioning, including the scientific level. The authors in question claim that the situation changed after the destruction of the WTC twin towers in the United States in 2001. Since that moment as it were, it became necessary to reassess the significance of the religious factor and its use in the studies on the global system.

THE SPHERES OF THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST'S INTEREST IN RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICS AND RELIGION

It should be observed that scholars are most interested in the sphere of relations between State and Church, both in the formal-legal and practical dimensions concerning Poland and other countries. There are many publications on this subject.²⁰ Worth noting are also studies on ideological-political currents that emphasize religious themes. First of all the Christian-Democratic trend but not only.²¹ The problem of relations between politics and religion was highlighted in

¹⁹ J. Fox, S. Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, New York 2004.

²⁰ Note several titles, inter alia excerpts from Rev. A. Zwoliński's book *Państwo a Europa* (State and Europe) Warsaw 2001; also excerpts from a study by Z. Zieliński, *Katolicyzm, człowiek i polityka. Przeszłość i teraźniejszość* (Catholicism, man, and politics. The past and the present), Lublin 2002; J. Krukowski, *Kościół i państwo. Podstawy relacji prawnych* (Church and State. Grounds of legal relations) Lublin 2000; P. Borecki, *Koncepcje stosunków między państwem a związkami wyznaniowymi w projektach i postulatach konstytucyjnych* (Conceptions of relations between State and denominational associations in the constitutional drafts and postulates), Warsaw 2002; Z. Zieliński, *Kościół w kręgu rzeczywistości politycznej* (Church in the sphere of political reality), Lublin 2003; *Spółeczeństwo, państwo, Kościół* (Society, State, Church) (1945–2000), (eds) A. Kawecki, K. Kowalczyk, A. Kubaj, Szczecin 2000.

²¹ For example: J. Majka, *Węzłowe problemy katolickiej nauki społecznej* (Key problems of Catholic social teaching), Rome – Warsaw 1990; J. Stefanowicz, *Chrześcijańska demokracja* (Christian Democracy), Warsaw 1963; J. Stefanowicz, *Chrześcijańska demokracja: inspiracja, doktryna, polityka* (Christian Democracy: inspiration, doctrine, and politics), Warsaw 1991; H. Przybylski, H. Przybyła, *Katolicka nauka społeczna a ruch chrześcijańsko-demokratyczny* (Catholic social teaching and the Christian-Democratic movement), Katowice 1996; C. Strzeszewski, *Katolicka nauka społeczna* (Catholic social teaching), Lublin 1994; *Chrześcijańska demokracja we*

the titles of several scholarly studies.²² Socio-religious problems in international relations are also the subject matter of many studies.²³ In this area we should also note studies concerning Europe and European integration.²⁴

There is an equally great interest in the problems relating to religious fundamentalism. This is not surprising because religious fundamentalism and extremism and their relations to the sphere of politics are probably the most urgent world problems at the close of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries. This problem actually became the focus of attention in the world in connection with the tragic events in the USA in 2001. One of the most eminent experts on fundamentalism, Bassam Tibi, proposes a thesis that the conflict between civilizations turns into a struggle between different varieties of religious fundamentalism – we must emphasize here that the issue is not the struggle between religions at all.²⁵ Religious fundamentalism creates a political philosophy while religious extremism should be defined, in my belief, as a peculiar expression of fundamentalist political philosophy. Bassam Tibi cautions against arbitrarily applying the notion of fundamentalism to growing religiousness or to extremism. It should be stressed, however, that fundamentalism is a far broader phenomenon than extremism but it is by spreading its values that it produces extremism.²⁶ Tibi holds a legitimate belief that fundamentalism itself has little in

współczesnym świecie (Christian Democracy in the present-day world) (eds) K. Krzywicka, E. Olaszewski, Lublin 1999; *Religia chrześcijańska a idee polityczne* (Christian religion and political ideas), (ed.) B. Grott, Kraków 1998; *Religia i Kościół rzymskokatolicki w polskiej myśli politycznej* (Religion and Roman Catholic Church in Polish political thought), (ed.) J. Jachymek, Lublin 1995.

²² Compare: *Religia i polityka* (Religion and politics), (ed.) B. Grott, Kraków 2000; K. Banek, *Religia a polityka w starożytnej Grecji. Od epoki mykeńskiej do Aleksandra Macedońskiego* (Religion and politics in ancient Greece. From the Mycenaean Age to Alexander the Great), Kraków 1985; Rev. A. Zwoliński, *Katolik i polityka* (The Catholic and politics), Kraków 1999; P. Michel, *Polityka i religia. Wielka przemiana* (*Politique et religion. La Grande Mutation*) transl. by B. Czarnomska, Kraków 2000.

²³ For example, a collection of studies *Problemy społeczno-religijne świata na progu trzeciego tysiąclecia* (Social-religious problems in the world at the door of the third millennium), Warsaw – Krynica Morska 2002; *Religia i kultura w globalizującym się świecie* (Religion and culture in the globalizing world), (eds) M. Kempny, G. Woroniecka, Kraków 1999; S. Piłaszewicz, *Potęga księgi i miecza prawdy. Religia, cywilizacja i kultura islamu w Afryce Zachodniej* (The power of the book and the sword of truth. Islamic religion, civilization and culture in West Africa), Warsaw 1994.

²⁴ For example: J.H.H. Weiler, *Chrześcijańska Europa. Konstytucyjny imperializm czy wielokulturowość?* (*A Christian Europe*) transl. by W. Michera, Poznań 2003; *Teologia w jednolitej Europie* (Theology in a united Europe) (ed.) Rev. S. Rąbiej, Opole 2001; *Religia – tożsamość – Europa* (Religion – identity – Europe) edited and compiled by P. Mazurkiewicz, S. Sowiński, Wrocław – Warsaw – Kraków 2005; *Religion in a Changing Europe. Between Pluralism and Fundamentalism. Selected Problems*, (ed.) M. Marczevska-Rytko, Lublin 2003.

²⁵ B. Tibi, *Fundamentalizm religijny* (Religious Fundamentalism) transl. by J. Danecki, Warsaw 1997, p. 16. Compare also the theses of Bassam Tibi's next book, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London 1998.

²⁶ Compare: M. Marczevska-Rytko, *Ekstremizm hinduski jako wyzwanie dla indyjskiego systemu demokratycznego* (Hindu extremism as a challenge to the Indian democratic system) [in:] *Doktryny i ruchy współczesnego ekstremizmu politycznego* (Doctrines and movements of the

common with the revival of religiousness but rather, as we should assume, it is an attempt to use religious legitimation in order to solve earthly problems, to mobilize members of a given community, and to legitimate political authority.

Hubertus Mynarek rightly observes that „religious fundamentalism is the most powerful and at the same time most attractive ideology, one that rouses the masses most, which is why any dictator will always seek to set some religion or faith to work for his own goals.”²⁷ And then, showing the sources of religious fundamentalism, he says with insight that man „wants the absolute truth, perfect happiness. But it is just as true as certain that he is unable to get to know them. This insurmountable gap between infinite desire and willingness on the one hand and finite possibilities on the other, between the utopian paradise ideal and its realizations, which get us back to earth time after time because they are continually far behind it, is taken advantage of by any fundamentalism.”²⁸ It is, therefore, obviously necessary to examine the problem of fundamentalism in the context of social and political visions. At this point we should acknowledge Marek Szulakiewicz’s initiative to collect in one volume the inquiries of philosophers, religious study experts and especially political scientists trying to explore the complexities of fundamentalism.²⁹ In this way an interdisciplinary work was compiled, showing the complexity of the phenomenon.

The interrelationships between religion and politics in the version of fundamentalism are demonstrated by its constitutive features. Many authors try to cope with this task more or less successfully.³⁰ My proposal consists in showing six crucial features that allow us to speak of religious fundamentalism.³¹ First, it criticizes the ruling elites for the departure from the principles of law and religious order. It sees the roots of all evil in abandoning the fundamentals of faith and in adopting principles belonging to alien cultures and civilizations. Second, the idea of return to religion, a religious revival, is treated as a remedy for all evil in the world. Thus, the appeal to tradition and its sources largely consists in reinterpreting them, adjusting to the demands of contemporary problems, con-

contemporary political extremism) (ed.) E. Olszewski, Lublin 2004, pp. 253–267; D. Duda, *Terroryzm islamski* (Islamic terrorism), Kraków 2002; *Islam a terroryzm* (Islam and terrorism), (ed.) A. Parzymies, Warsaw 2003; *Islam a świat* (Islam and the world), (eds) R. Bäcker, S. Kitab, Toruń 2003.

²⁷ H. Mynarek, *Zakaz myślenia. Fundamentalizm w chrześcijaństwie i islamie* (*Denkverbot. Fundamentalismus in Christentum und Islam*) transl. by S. Lisiecka, Gdynia 1996, p. 33.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 34.

²⁹ *Fundamentalizm i kultura* (Fundamentalism and cultures), (ed.) M. Szulakiewicz, Toruń 2005.

³⁰ For example Rev. Bishop John Joseph in his article *Fundamentalizm religijny a problem naruszania społecznej harmonii* (Religious fundamentalism and the problem of infringement upon social harmony) [in:] <http://www.misin.pl/biblioteka/fundam.html>; also Archbishop J. Życiński, *Na Zachód od domu niewoli* (West of the house of captivity), Poznań 1997, pp. 159–176.

³¹ M. Marczewska-Rytko, *Fundamentalizm religijny: dylematy terminologiczno-metodologiczne* (Religious fundamentalism: terminological and methodological dilemmas) [in:] *Fundamentalizm i kultura* (Fundamentalism and cultures), ..., pp. 45–60.

flicts, and tasks. Most often this means reference to the Holy Book as the source of absolute truth. Third, advocates of fundamentalism appear as those who know the plans of the Absolute, have the monopoly of the truth and ways of remedying the situation. Fourth, all others are treated as enemies. Fifth, the principles characteristic of the religious order are extended over other spheres of man's functioning: economic or political. Moreover, it is a rule that the life of the individual and the social systems he creates are subordinated to religious commands. The authority and the legal system derive their legitimacy from the religious order, recognizing its supremacy. Sixth, fundamentalism is highly active in the social and political arena, striving to abolish the established social order and replace it with a new one. The use of violence is justified by noble ends and, as for example Peter Partner observes, the idea of holy war is not characteristic of the Islamic religion only.³²

The basic feature of fundamentalisms is certainly an attempt to be confined within the developed sets of values, thereby making the dialogue between individual civilizations and cultures difficult.³³ Moreover, fundamentalism is a challenge to the secular state, to its aspirations for development and modernization. Religious fundamentalism appears to generate a peculiar political philosophy, which admits of the use of extremist methods to implement it and, for that reason above all, it cannot escape the political scientist's attention. Contrary to widespread beliefs, however, it is not basically anti-modern (The Taliban movement is an exception here).³⁴ Generally, its advocates are against some consequences resulting from modernization processes, especially those related to the lifestyle or ways of dressing. They themselves, however, use many achievements of modernity, particularly in the field of information transmission technologies or military ones. We should also stress that fundamentalism is not synonymous with nationalism, orthodoxy, or traditionalism. Nationalism (or nationalist fundamentalism) does not appeal to religion in the first place, it is based on a concrete nation, and challenges the right of another community to self-

³² P. Partner, *Wojownicy Boga. Święte wojny chrześcijaństwa i islamu* (God of Battles. Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam) transl. by J. Kozłowski, Warsaw 2000.

³³ In the context of the issues discussed in the cited collective study: *Fundamentalizm i kultury*, ..., worth noting are the articles by: E. Sakowicz, *Katolickie tradycjonalistyczne Bractwo Świętego Piusa X wobec ekumenizmu i dialogu międzyreligijnego* (The catholic traditionalist Brotherhood of Saint Pius X vis-à-vis ecumenism and interreligious dialog); Rev. J. Dębiński, *Integryzm i tradycjonalizm posoborowych kontestatorów Kościoła rzymskokatolickiego u schyłku XX wieku* (Integrism and traditionalism of the post-Council dissenters from Roman Catholic Church at the close of the 20th century); Rev. Z. Kunicki, *Fundamentalizm religijny wobec liberalnych wyzwań* (Religious fundamentalism vis-à-vis liberal challenges); K. Liedel, *Fundamentalizm islamski w kontekście bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego* (Islamic fundamentalism in the context of national security). See also: M. Hanna, *O dialogu cywilizacji, czyli o potrzebie akceptowania innych* (On the dialog of civilizations or the need to accept the others) selected and transl. by J. Zdanowski, Warsaw 2004.

³⁴ Compare: A. Rashid, *Talibowie. Wojący islam, ropa naftowa i fundamentalizm w środkowej Azji* (The Taliban, Islam, Oil ...) transl. by D. Chylińska, A. Lipszyc, J. Piątkowska, Kraków 2002; J. Modrzejewska-Leśniewska, *Talibowie* (The Taliban), Pułtusk 2001.

determination. This allows us, for example, to distinguish religious and nationalist fundamentalism in Israel.³⁵ Also orthodoxy alone without being broadened with additional elements does not allow us to speak of fundamentalism. A fundamentalist element can act against the democratic order and strive to replace it with natural law derived from the religious order. What is necessary here is the demand for extending the professed values over the whole society and subordination of all spheres of life to religion. This is also the case with traditionalism. Communalism in turn usually has one clearly defined enemy, against which it acts. Religious fundamentalism, however, is characterized by the attitude of the besieged fortress, where all those casting doubt on the preached truths are perceived as enemies. This also applies to one's own community. Only one established way of interpretation (or as fundamentalists would have it: exclusion from interpretation) of the Holy Book is admissible, the book epitomizing the absolute truth and its derivative principles of the social order. People can but obey uncritically. The political scientist's investigation of these issues appears to be extremely important.³⁶ For on the one hand it provides new variables for classic political science research, while on the other it brings a new look at the problems that are on the periphery of political science inquiries. I emphasized the necessity of conducting interdisciplinary research in other publications.³⁷

Another problem of interest to the political scientist should be the question of mutual relations between religion and democracy. We should treat as passé all those scientific conceptions according to which religion can function in the contemporary world only in the private sphere. It should be noted that the problem in question appears to be gaining in importance, especially when we are looking towards societies dominated by great universalistic religions, especially Islam, but not only. The question therefore arises whether religion and democracy are compatible within one social order. At least three groups of answers can be distinguished.³⁸ According to one point of view, religion is incompatible with the democratic order. Followers of another approach maintain that the democratic system cannot exist without the substructure of religion and, therefore, the latter plays an important role in the social order. It satisfies those needs of the mem-

³⁵ P. Paziński, *Kapelusze i jarmułki. Żydowski fundamentalizm religijny i nacjonalistyczny* (Hats and yarmulkes. Jewish religious and nationalist fundamentalism) „Znak” 1998, no. 514 (March).

³⁶ See for example: S. Sowiński, *Zjawisko sekularyzacji i fundamentalizmów religijnych jako wyzwanie dla nauk politycznych* (The phenomenon of secularization and religious fundamentalisms as a challenge to political science), „Studia Nauk Politycznych” 2004, no. 1, pp. 197–202.

³⁷ For example: M. Marczevska-Rytka, *Dylematy badań politologicznych w epoce wyzwań globalizacyjnych* (Dilemmas of political science research at the age of globalization challenges), „Studia Nauk Politycznych” 2004, no. 1, pp. 45–58.

³⁸ M. Marczevska-Rytka, *Religia a demokracja – punkty sporu, punkty zgody* (Religion and democracy – points of contention, points of consent), report delivered at the conference titled *Demokracja w dobie globalizacji* (Democracy at the age of globalization), Institute of Political Science and Journalism, University of Silesia, Ustroń, 22–24 September 2004 (in press).

bers of society that are not part of responsibilities fulfilled by the state and its institutions. The third approach: one cannot conclusively say whether religion and democracy are generally incompatible or not. I find the last approach most acceptable. Individual religions, I believe, have functional and dysfunctional elements from the point of view of being able to merge with the democratic system. This applies both to the assumptions of religious doctrine, forms of worship, and religious organization. In Owen Chodwick's reflections, relations between democracy and religion can be reduced to several problems.³⁹ The writer clearly subscribes to the principles of the liberal-democratic order; nevertheless, no political system is safe without a moral foundation. Acknowledgment that the liberal-democratic order is the most rational solution for contemporary societies does not safeguard us against all kinds of abuse coming from all sides. Gaining the loyalty of a society is directly linked with the guarantee of religious freedoms and liberties carrying with them other liberties. According to Chodwick, democracy needs moralists, prophets and saints but not in the role of philosopher-kings since they are a disaster in this capacity but because without their charisma and inspiration democracy grows materialistic and becomes stunted.⁴⁰

The problem of relation between religion and democracy is a challenge to the political scientist both in the dimension of national states, which have solved this question in various ways, and in the dimension of individual civilizational circles. On the one hand, therefore, religion can undermine the principles of the democratic system, while on the other – to a considerable part of the world – democracy is an attack on social systems based on religious principles.⁴¹

³⁹ O. Chodwick, *Demokracja a religia* (Democracy and religion) [in:] *Europa i społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo* (Europe and civic society. Conversations in Castel Gandolfo), ed. and foreword by K. Michalski, Warsaw 1994, p. 129.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 143.

⁴¹ Here are some of the publications: Rev. P. Mazurkiewicz, *Kościół i demokracja* (Church and democracy), Warsaw 2001; J. Gowin, *Kościół w czasach wolności 1989–1999* (Church at the time of freedom ...), Kraków 1999; A. Besançon, *Chrześcijaństwo i demokracja* (*Chretiente et democratie*) [in:] *Konstytucjonalizm. Demokracja. Wolność* (Constitutionalism. Democracy. Freedom) selected by P. Śpiewak, Warsaw 1996, pp. 222–228; F. Champion, *Religia obywatelska: angielski wyjątek* (Civic religion: the English exception) „Kultura i Społeczeństwo” 2003, no. 4, pp. 115–129; P. Woroniecki, *Demokracja jako zasada życia politycznego w katolickiej myśli społecznej w Polsce* (Democracy as a principle of political life in Catholic social teaching) [in:] *Idea demokracji w polskiej tradycji intelektualnej* (The idea of democracy in Polish intellectual tradition) (eds) B. Fijałkowska, P. Woroniecki, Olsztyn 1995, pp. 29–42; *Neutralność światopoglądowa państwa* (Worldview neutrality of the state) (ed.) E. Nowicka-Włodarczyk, Kraków 1998; R. Graczyk, *Polski Kościół, polska demokracja* (Polish Church, Polish democracy), Kraków 1999; J. Mariański, *Religia i Kościół w społeczeństwie pluralistycznym. Polska lat dziewięćdziesiątych* (Religion and Church in the pluralist society. Poland of the Nineties), Lublin 1993; *Islam a demokracja* (Islam and democracy), (ed.) A. Mrozek-Dumanowska, Warsaw 1999.

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It should be emphasized that the relations between politics and religion are largely manifested in the present day in the greater importance of religious fundamentalism and in the growing significance of the religious factor in the globalizing world. From the standpoint of the complexity of the subject matter under investigation and the reliability of the studies conducted, religious study experts, sociologists or political scientists themselves could have much to say here. As can be easily observed, religious fundamentalism, for example, assumes the form of political philosophy and the proposed methods of activity are transformed into the methods of political struggle. In this way, religious fundamentalism challenging the foundations and functioning of the social and political order cannot leave the political scientist indifferent to the consequences of such actions. This is also the case with the other aforementioned spheres of contemporary relations between politics and religion. From Poland's standpoint, problems with Muslim fundamentalism remain a somewhat exotic issue but already other forms of fundamentalism are no strangers to us. Under Polish circumstances, what turns out to be important are the problems of using religion in the sphere of politics, above all in its legitimating function. Perhaps Zbigniew Stachowski's conclusions that „Poland is a special European case of the state where religious legitimation is still an essential and even necessary condition for exercising authority”⁴² should be treated as the starting point for in-depth political science research into the relations of politics vis-à-vis religion in Poland. It should be stressed that the numbers of publications on the subject have recently been growing rapidly. Their thoroughness and at the same time the inquiring abilities of scholars are obviously varied. I would like to quote several titles because, I believe, they show the directions of the authors' investigations of the subject matter.⁴³

⁴² Z. Stachowski, *Dwa wymiary religijności* (Two dimensions of religiousness), „Człowiek i Społeczeństwo” 2004, vol. XXIII, p. 72.

⁴³ I will only name reports delivered at two conferences I recently attended: the conference held at the Institute of Political Science, Pedagogical University in Kraków on 18–19 May 2006, proceedings published in the book *Model przywództwa* (Model of leadership), (ed.) A.K. Piasecki, Kraków 2006, and the conference held at the Collegium Civitas in Warsaw on 26–28 May 2006. These are for example the following reports: K. Pokorna-Ignatowicz, *Przywódca nie tylko duchowy, czyli problem z ojcem Rydzykiem* (Not just a spiritual leader or the problem with Father Rydzyk); D. Góra-Szopiński, *Strategiczny problem integrizmu. Przypadek Radia Maryja* (The strategic problem of integrism. The case of Radio Maryja); J. Sieradzan, *Charyzma i szaleństwo w działalności niektórych przywódców ruchów religijnych* (Charisma and madness in the activities of some leaders of religious movements); H. Szczerbak, *Przywództwo w organizacjach religijnych* (Leadership in religious organizations) – *New Christian Rights*; B. Jagiełło, *Przywództwo religijne czy polityczne? Analiza problemu na przykładzie wybranych państw muzułmańskich* (Religious or political leadership? The analysis of the problem exemplified by selected Muslim states); K. Liedel, *Osama Bin Laden – charyzmatyczny przywódca czy symbol* (... a charismatic leader or symbol); D. Góra-Szopiński, *Przywództwo bez wysiłku. Polityczna skuteczność Radia Maryja* (Leadership

The problem of the position of religion and questions of religious freedoms in the European Union appear to be just as important. The interest of the scholars seems to correspond here with the independently ongoing public discussion. It appears that the problem of religious freedom has become part of the broader context of reflections on freedom as such and at the same time the emerging attempts to contest it. In the present paper I focused on several crucial questions; they by no means exhaust the complexity of the problem.⁴⁴

RELACJE MIĘDZY POLITYKĄ I RELIGIĄ JAKO WYZWANIE DLA POLITOLOGÓW

Streszczenie. Celem artykułu jest ukazanie złożoności a zarazem wagi badań nad relacjami między polityką i religią. Artykuł został podzielony na trzy części. W pierwszej z nich wskazano na przykłady wzajemnych powiązań między polityką i religią na przestrzeni wieków, podkreślono legitymizacyjny charakter religii z punktu widzenia władzy i przywództwa. Część druga jest poświęcona znaczeniu czynnika religijnego w badaniach politologicznych. Wskazano przyczyny stosunkowo niedużego zainteresowania czynnikiem religijnym (w dużej mierze pokłosie oświecenia francuskiego) oraz przytoczono wybrane głosy wybitnych uczonych, upominających się o przywrócenie właściwej rangi temu czynnikowi w badaniach politologicznych. W części trzeciej wyodrębniono kilka istotnych obszarów zainteresowań politologa w relacjach między polityką i religią. Należą do nich między innymi: problemy płaszczyzny kulturowo-religijnej i poszukiwanie miejsca dla religii w integrującej się Europie; wzrost znaczenia ruchów i ugrupowań odwołujących się w warstwie ideowej do fundamentalizmu religijnego, w tym przede wszystkim do fundamentalizmu muzułmańskiego; obszar relacji państwo – Kościół tak w wymiarze formalno-prawnym, jak i praktycznym; obszar wzajemnych relacji między religią i demokracją.

Słowa kluczowe: polityka, religia, politologia, fundamentalizm, legitymizacja, demokracja, państwo

without effort. The political effectiveness of Radio Maryja); M. Marczevska-Rytka, *Przywództwo religijne* (Religious leadership).

⁴⁴ M. Marczevska-Rytka, *Religijna legitymizacja przywództwa* (The religious legitimacy of leadership) [in:] *Przywództwo polityczne. Teorie i rzeczywistość* (Political leadership. Theories and reality) (eds) L. Rubisz, K. Zuba, Toruń 2004, pp. 129–143; M. Marczevska-Rytka, *Sprzężenie polityki i religii jako problem badawczy politologii* (Links between politics and religion as a political science research problem) report delivered at the conference, titled *Główne problemy badawcze i metodologiczne współczesnej politologii w Polsce* (The main methodological and research problems of present-day political science in Poland), Institute of Political Science, University of Gdańsk, 8–10 November 2004 (in press).